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ABSTRACT 
Military commanders are not just officers leading soldiers into battle. 
In the military justice system, they also serve quasi-prosecutorial roles 
and decide what charges to bring and whether to accept a plea. With this 
responsibility comes the potential for misconduct, no different than with 
civilian prosecutors. Commanders too can improperly coerce witnesses or 
withhold favorable evidence. Enter the “unlawful command influence” 
doctrine, the military’s response to combating this misconduct. While 
routinely associated with civilian prosecutorial misconduct, the military 
standard turns out to be very different and seems to better protect against 
improper influence than its civilian counterpart. What accounts for this 
difference, given that both standards are designed to ensure a fair and 
impartial trial?  
This Article is the first to raise this varying treatment and explore 
potential explanations. It ultimately teases out the concepts of “systemic 
integrity” and “individual autonomy” from the respective stories. The 
military’s focus on procedural protections and concern for the appearance 
of impropriety reveals a value for systemic integrity, whereas the civilian 
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emphasis on defendant choice and finality of proceedings reveals a value 
for individual autonomy. This is not simply an academic exercise. These 
concepts can help frame current controversies surrounding prosecutorial 
and commander discretion. On the civilian side, scholars and judges alike 
have widely criticized courts for not doing enough to combat prosecutorial 
misconduct. On the military side, legislators have railed against 
commanders for their lack of prosecution of sexual assault crimes. 
Recognizing which value—individual autonomy or systemic integrity—
underlies these practices can better assist necessary reforms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At first blush, a civilian prosecutor and military commander may not 
seem to have much in common. One is a lawyer who holds wide 
discretionary authority over charging decisions and plea agreements, while 
the other is a trained officer who leads troops into battle and defends the 
country. But in the military justice system, commanders also serve quasi-
prosecutorial roles and wield the same discretionary authority over charges 
and pleas. This power naturally brings with it the potential for misconduct, 
no different than with civilian prosecutors. The military’s response to 
regulating commander misconduct has developed as the doctrine of 
“unlawful command influence.”1 This Article compares this doctrine with 
how prosecutorial misconduct is handled in the civilian system.
2
 It turns 
out the two standards are very different even though they are designed to 
combat the same issue. I explore potential reasons for this varying 
treatment and ultimately deduce two different underlying frameworks 
from the respective practices.  
The military has a unique role in our society. Its mission is to fight 
wars and defend against foreign threats. Military commanders, in turn, 
take on significant responsibility in leading troops toward these ends. Part 
of this responsibility includes maintaining good order and discipline 
 
 
 1. See infra Part I.B. 
 2. This Article focuses on federal prosecutors, rather than state prosecutors, as the natural 
analogue to military commanders given their common federal-based authority. See, e.g., Uniform 
Code of Military Justice arts. 1–146, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2014) [hereinafter UCMJ]; see also infra 
Part II.B.  
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among the ranks.
3
 This means commanders wear many different hats. In 
addition to their combat role, for example, they serve quasi-judicial roles. 
In this capacity, they adjudge punishment for minor offenses,
4
 pick 
potential jurors for trial,
5
 and grant post-clemency relief.
6
 Another central 
function, and the focus of this Article, is their quasi-prosecutorial role. 
Commanders hold the discretion that one typically associates with civilian 
prosecutors. They alone decide what charges, if any, should be brought 
and the terms of any plea bargain.
7
 This means military prosecutors—the 
ones actually trying the cases—ultimately take their cues from 
commanders on these key issues.
8
  
Commanders, thus, can potentially taint a defendant’s right to a fair 
and impartial trial—much like civilian prosecutors—by, for example, 
interfering with a juror or withholding favorable evidence.
9
 As one 
military court explains, “[c]ommand influence is the mortal enemy of 
military justice.”10 Enter the unlawful command influence doctrine—a 
post-World War II law that seeks to curtail commander misconduct and its 
impact on the fairness of a criminal trial.
11
  
The key question in raising such a misconduct claim is whether the 
conduct prejudiced the defendant. Four features are worth noting: the 
government always carries the burden of showing that there was no 
prejudice, courts do not consider a commander’s intent in the analysis, the 
defendant cannot waive her right to this claim on appeal during plea 
negotiations, and, most notably, courts subject the conduct to an 
appearance of impropriety test, even if there is no actual prejudice.
12
 The 
 
 
 3. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy W. Murphy, A Defense of the Role of the Convening Authority: 
The Integration of Justice and Discipline, THE REPORTER, Sept. 2001, at 3; David A. Schlueter, 
American Military Justice: Responding to the Siren Songs for Reform, 73 A.F. L. REV. 193, 208 
(2015). 
 4. This practice is referred to as non-judicial punishment and typically involves minor offenses. 
See UCMJ art. 15. 
 5. UCMJ art. 25; see also infra Part I.A. 
 6. UCMJ art. 60; infra Part III.A.3. 
 7. See infra Part I.A. It is also worth noting that soldiers can be prosecuted for any crime even if 
it has no connection to their military service. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987). This 
was not always the case. In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court briefly adopted a service connection 
requirement for court-martial jurisdiction. See Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971); 
O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).  
 8. See infra Part II.A. 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986). 
 11. See UCMJ art. 37.  
 12. See infra Part I.B–C. 
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combined effect is a doctrine that seems well crafted to deter a 
commander’s improper influence over the trial process.13  
The somewhat curious part of this doctrine has been its association 
with prosecutorial misconduct in the civilian system. Military courts and 
scholars alike have equated or otherwise likened the two types of 
misconduct.
14
 As one military court explains, “[a] commander . . . is 
closely enough related to the prosecution of the case that the use of 
command influence by him and his staff equates to ‘prosecutorial 
misconduct.’”15 On one account, this association makes sense since both 
commanders and civilian prosecutors share the same discretionary 
authority. The problem, however, is that this likeness has been in name 
only. While civilian courts also use prejudice as the key factor, the 
standard turns out to be quite different. Unlike unlawful command 
influence, with civilian prosecutorial misconduct, the burden of showing 
prejudice shifts depending on the defendant’s actions at trial, courts often 
consider a prosecutor’s state of mind, a defendant can waive her ability to 
raise a misconduct claim on appeal during plea negotiations, and, perhaps 
most notably, courts do not engage in an appearance of impropriety test.
16
 
The combination of these differences creates a system that seems to more 
easily insulate instances of misconduct. To be sure, scholars and judges 
alike have all bemoaned the seemingly chronic problem of civilian 
prosecutorial misconduct and criticized courts’ inability to prevent it.17  
What explains or otherwise justifies the divergent standards? Both the 
military and civilian systems come from the same adversarial heritage and 
attempt to promote the same thing—a fair and untainted trial.18 In fact, 
readers may be surprised to learn that the military provides a more robust 
mechanism here than the civilian system. Given the association with 
prosecutorial misconduct, military courts could have easily adopted the 
 
 
 13. I am not making a claim based on data or evidence, as there is none on this issue. Rather, my 
conclusion rests on the collective force of the various features of the doctrine (e.g., the burden of 
proof, appearance of impropriety test) along with how courts have interpreted them. See infra Part I.B–
C. 
 14. Thomas, 22 M.J. at 393; Major Guy P. Glazier, He Called for His Pipe, and He Called for 
His Bowl, and He Called for His Members Three—Selection of Military Juries by the Sovereign: 
Impediment to Military Justice, 157 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 15. Thomas, 22 M.J. at 393. 
 16. See infra Part II.B. 
 17. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Using Sentencing to Clean Up Criminal Procedure: Incorporating 
Remedial Sentence Reduction into Federal Sentencing Law, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 29, 30–31 (2008); 
The Editorial Board, Rampant Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.nyti 
mes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sunday/rampant-prosecutorial-misconduct.html?_r=2; see also infra Part 
II.C. 
 18. See infra notes 299–300 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1406 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1401 
 
 
 
 
more lax standard to police unlawful command influence.
19
 They, 
however, did not. It won’t do to simply say that commanders are not the 
ones trying cases, since commander misconduct can equally influence the 
fairness of trial proceedings.
20
 If anything, this line of reasoning would 
only seem to suggest that civilian prosecutorial misconduct should be 
more heavily scrutinized.
21
  
To further complicate matters, the military uses the more deferential 
civilian standard when assessing misconduct claims against military 
prosecutors, even though military courts often talk about military 
prosecutorial misconduct as a subset of unlawful command influence.
22
 
Thus, the military applies different standards to address misconduct by 
military prosecutors and commanders during courts-martial. First, for 
commanders, the military applies the “unlawful command influence” 
standard, and second, for military prosecutors, the military applies a 
“prosecutorial misconduct” standard, which is very similar to the civilian 
“prosecutorial misconduct” standard.23 
This Article explores various potential explanations that may account 
for the varying prosecutorial misconduct and unlawful command influence 
standards.
24
 The most obvious difference—though interestingly not 
discussed by military courts—is the fact that commanders, unlike 
prosecutors, do not have the same legal training, nor are commanders 
bound by professional ethical rules.
25
 This lack of professional training 
and accountability may, in turn, explain why military courts use the more 
deferential misconduct standard for military prosecutors.
26
 Commanders 
also wield significantly more authority over the military justice system—
including oversight of military subordinates—compared with either 
civilian or military prosecutors. The historical context and idiosyncratic 
evolution of the respective systems can provide some additional 
clarification: the military justice system historically suffered from 
publicity problems related to unfettered command discretion, whereas the 
civilian system’s historical trajectory may suggest a concern for a 
prolonged appeal process and a desire to finalize verdicts.
27
  
 
 
 19. See infra Part III.A. 
 20. See infra Parts I.B, III.A. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
 23. See infra Part II. 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 26. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 27. See infra Part III.A.4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] UNRAVELING UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE 1407 
 
 
 
 
Working from each system’s respective standard and specific 
evolution, I tease out the competing principles of systemic integrity and 
individual autonomy.
28
 My focus here is on the criminal trial process itself 
(and not civil or other collateral remedial systems) and how these 
philosophies are expressed in each system. This Article uses systemic 
integrity to refer to protections that are intended to preserve fairness in the 
system.
29
 The point here is to insert restraints or tests that cannot easily be 
circumvented so that the defendant is assured an impartial trial. Individual 
autonomy, on the other hand, values freedom of choice and 
independence.
30
 This Article incorporates two values into this term: 
defendant choice and the independence of individual actors in the criminal 
justice system. The former value is relatively straightforward. Defendants 
should have the ability to choose the course of their trial and make choices 
about waiving procedural protections.
31
 The second feature of autonomy 
fosters deregulation and allows actors of the criminal justice system (e.g., 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, etc.) to carry out their responsibilities 
without imposition of significant oversight.
32
 The key here is to trust that 
these individuals will make the correct choices.  
These competing values of systemic integrity and individual autonomy 
are already expressed to varying degrees in both criminal justice systems. 
For instance, military and civilian defendants alike are accorded a 
presumption of innocence, with the government always carrying the 
burden of proof to show guilt.
33
 These constitutional features signal 
systemic integrity values because they are unalterable protections intended 
to protect the defendant and assure a fair outcome. The use of plea-
 
 
 28. See infra Part III.B. 
 29. This feature shares elements of procedural and substantive justice. Procedural justice (or 
formal justice, as it is sometimes called) focuses on following procedures to ensure just outcomes and 
has been invoked in the criminal and civil contexts. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. 
Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and Integrative 
Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473 (2008); Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural 
Justice, 42 GA. L. REV. 407 (2008); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 
321 (2004); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26 (2007). Substantive 
justice focuses on the actual outcome and whether it is just. See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, Justification and 
Doctrinal Evolution, 37 CONN. L. REV. 389 (2004). This Article does not seek to engage in a 
comprehensive analysis of these two principles. For a more thorough discussion, see, e.g., Nicholas 
Faso, Civil Disobedience in the Supreme Court: Retroactivity and the Compromise Between Formal 
and Substantive Justice, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1613 (2012).  
 30. This value can also be a central part of a procedural justice model. See Solum, supra note 29, 
at 275. I am simply separating the non-autonomy values relevant to procedural justice and placing 
them in the category of systemic integrity.  
 31. See infra Part III.B.  
 32. See infra Part III.B. 
 33. UCMJ art. 51(c); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483–86 (1978). 
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1408 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1401 
 
 
 
 
bargaining, on the other hand, indicates a concern for defendant choice.
34
 
Defendants in both systems are in full control of whether they will forgo 
trial and plead guilty. Judicial recusal procedures provide a prime example 
of the second feature of autonomy. After a party moves to recuse a 
military or civilian trial judge, the judge herself decides whether her 
recusal is appropriate with no procedural constraints and little to no 
oversight.
35
 More generally speaking, the adversarial system itself can be 
thought of as a combination of systemic integrity and individual autonomy 
values. Within the constraints of constitutional requirements and 
evidentiary rules (examples of systemic integrity), attorneys—prosecutors 
and defense attorneys—are free to present and develop their case as they 
see fit (an instance of individual autonomy).
36
 
Turning specifically to the unlawful command influence doctrine, it 
seems that the military implicitly values systemic integrity more than 
individual autonomy.
37
 The burden of proof on the government never 
changes, and defendants can’t waive their right to raise such claims as part 
of a plea agreement.
38
 These features ensure systemic fairness without 
regard to defendant choice. Similarly, the system does not seem to put 
 
 
 34. See UCMJ art. 45; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; infra note 298 and accompanying text. 
 35. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2014) (noting that a district or magistrate judge disqualifies 
herself as appropriate); United States v. Wright, 52 M.J. 136, 141 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (citation omitted) 
(“The motion to disqualify a military judge may be made by a party or by the judge sua sponte. Once 
made, it is the judge who decides this issue of law.”); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 
1202–03 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Section 455 clearly contemplates that decisions with respect to 
disqualification should be made by the judge sitting in the case, and not by another judge.”); United 
States v. Cockerell, 49 C.M.R. 567, 574 (A.C.M.R 1974) (“Whether the judge should withdraw from 
the case . . . will be left to the informed discretion of the military judge.”); CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, 
2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7–8 (2011) (“All of the federal courts follow 
essentially the same process in resolving recusal questions. In the lower courts, individual judges 
decide for themselves whether recusal is warranted, sometimes in response to a formal written motion 
from a party, and sometimes at the judge’s own initiative.”); Raymond J. McKoski, Disqualifying 
Judges When Their Impartiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned: Moving Beyond a Failed Standard, 
56 ARIZ. L. REV. 411, 448 (2014) (discussing how most states follow the federal system where judges 
decide their own recusal motions). Parties can appeal the decision, but appellate courts are very 
deferential, and reverals of non-recusal are thus very rare. See Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 631, 652 (2015) (“While there are some exceptions, the judge’s 
decision [to recuse herself] usually is final, subject only to appellate review. That appellate review, 
however, is generally highly deferential to the judge’s decision, and reversals are rare.”); see also 
Cockerell, 49 C.M.R. at 574 (“While his discretion is subject to review, the determination of the judge 
will be accorded great weight and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous.”). 
 36. See generally Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 420 (1992) (“For example, in our adversary system the strength with which 
each side is able to present its case depends in large part on the freedom of the parties to ascertain and 
present to the trier of fact all relevant evidence.”). 
 37. See infra Part III.B. 
 38. See infra Part II.B.4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/5
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much faith in commanders’ doing the right thing with no further oversight. 
For one thing, a commander’s intent is not relevant, as the focus is solely 
on whether the defendant’s trial was tainted. Moreover, even if there is no 
prejudice, courts still scrutinize a commander’s actions through the public 
lens as a prophylactic measure to ensure confidence in the system.
39
  
The civilian system’s response to prosecutorial misconduct, on the 
other hand, underscores an emphasis on individual autonomy.
40
 Defendant 
choice plays heavily in how (and whether) these misconduct claims are 
resolved. Their actions decide what the appellate standard will be or 
whether the claim will be waived entirely through a plea agreement.
41
 As 
to prosecutor autonomy, the use of a more deferential standard and the fact 
that there is no appearance of impropriety test implicitly assume that 
prosecutors will dutifully carry out their jobs before the verdict is 
finalized.
42
 This promotion of prosecutorial independence may be further 
explained by the fact that these individuals are theoretically already bound 
by professional ethical rules.
43
 
Invocation of these competing principles is not simply an academic 
exercise. The distinction can serve normative ends by illuminating ways to 
reform the systems. Take the concern over widespread instances of 
civilian prosecutorial misconduct.
44
 It would seem that the promotion of 
individual autonomy in this context has made it too easy for prosecutors to 
infect trial proceedings. Perhaps trusting that these attorneys will carry out 
their jobs is overly optimistic. After all, like commanders, these 
individuals also may become too invested in winning their cases. The 
civilian system needs to take a chapter out of the military playbook and 
impose greater structural or systemic protections into the system. This 
could include incorporating an appearance of impropriety test or creating a 
uniform burden of proof
45
 or, as some scholars have suggested, changing 
 
 
 39. See infra Part I.C. 
 40. I am not suggesting that the civilian response to this misconduct does not share some element 
of systemic integrity. Prejudice remains the key test. However, the focus here is on the relative 
differences between the two systems beyond this shared substantive baseline. See generally infra Part 
II.B. Furthermore, outside the trial process, prosecutors are theoretically also held accountable by 
professional ethics boards or civil suits. While these mechanisms purportedly promote systemic 
integrity (albeit outside the criminal trial process and not the focus of this Article), the consensus 
appears to be that they are not effective. See infra notes 245, 272–77 and accompanying text. In any 
case, the focus of this Article is on the criminal trial process.  
 41. See infra Part II.B.2–3. 
 42. See infra Part III.B. 
 43. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 44. See infra Part II.C. 
 45. See infra Part III.C. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the prejudice standard itself or otherwise (moving outside the criminal trial 
process) making sure prosecutors are sanctioned for their misconduct.
46
  
These values may also be useful to an examination of the current 
controversy surrounding sexual assault in the military and what many 
consider a lack of prosecution by commanders.
47
 The doctrine of unlawful 
command influence does not apply here because the issue is not interfering 
with the fairness of trial after charges have become official, but rather 
choosing not to bring charges against putative defendants in the first place. 
Commanders—like prosecutors in the civilian system—have wide 
authority on these charging decisions.
48
 It may be time to rein in this 
autonomy—at least in the context of sexual assault crimes in the 
military—and impose systemic restraints on these decisions, much like 
military courts have done during the trial process. Potential solutions could 
include forcing commanders to work with military prosecutors in bringing 
sexual assault charges or revoking their authority to bring these types of 
cases and placing it with other military leaders.
49
 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I traces the historical 
development of the unlawful command influence doctrine and its unique 
elements. Part II focuses on prosecutorial misconduct in the civilian 
system and compares its relatively deferential standard to the more 
stringent military unlawful command influence standard. Part III explores 
various explanations for the disparate treatment. From the respective 
stories, I tease out the concepts of systemic integrity and individual 
autonomy and show how these principles can help frame potential reforms 
in both systems.  
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE DOCTRINE 
A. Early Beginnings  
The system of commander-centered discretion has roots in the English 
military system and has remained largely unchanged.
50
 The original 
 
 
 46. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 
TEX. L. REV. 629, 669 (1972); Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 441–42 (1980). 
 47. See, e.g., Eric R. Carpenter, The Military’s Sexual Assault Blind Spot, 21 WASH. & LEE J. 
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 383 (2015); Helene Cooper, Pentagon Study Finds 50% Increase in Reports 
of Military Sexual Assaults, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/us/ 
military-sex-assault-report.html?_r=0.  
 48. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 49. See infra Part III.C. 
 50. David A. Schlueter, The Military Justice Conundrum: Justice or Discipline?, 215 MIL. L. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/5
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American military code, called the Articles of War––in place until just 
after World War II—gave commanding officers wide discretion in 
bringing and disposing of charges against their subordinates.
51
 They 
specifically bestowed commanders with quasi-judicial and prosecutorial 
authority, including the ability to convene a court-martial (i.e., officially 
bring charges); appoint the jury, defense attorney, and prosecutor; and 
approve of any sentence.
52
 Subsequent iterations of the Articles of War did 
little to change the authority of commanders.
53
 The rationale here centers 
on the nature of the military and its unique mission as a fighting force.
54
 
Commanders are responsible for making sure “that a particular unit 
successfully performs its mission.”55 Part of this responsibility includes 
maintaining good order and discipline among the ranks. Breaches of 
discipline can undermine mission effectiveness.
56
 It makes sense then that 
commanders, not attorneys, decide whether to bring charges and what 
charges should be brought against a subordinate within the command.
57
  
During this period, there was, in turn, little oversight of the 
commander’s prerogative over the military justice system. The 
 
 
REV. 1, 4–5 (2013); Luther C. West, A History of Command Influence on the Military Judicial System, 
18 UCLA L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1970). 
 51. Major Donald W. Hansen, Judicial Functions for the Commander?, 41 MIL. L. REV. 1 
(1968); West, supra note 50, at 7–8; see also generally Edmund M. Morgan, The Background of the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953); Captain (P) David A. Schlueter, The 
Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. REV. 129, 145–48 (1980).  
 52. Act of April 10, 1806, ch. 20, 2 Stat. 359, 367; Andrew A. Bruce, Double Jeopardy and the 
Power of Review in Court-Martial Proceedings, 3 MINN. L. REV. 484, 486–87 (1918); Hansen, supra 
note 51, at 10–19; West, supra note 50, at 7–8.  
 53. Schlueter, supra note 51, at 150–58; West, supra note 50, at 28–40. 
 54. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 
350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955); Schlueter, supra note 3, at 207–11. 
 55. Murphy, supra note 3, at 4; see also Schlueter, supra note 3, at 207–11. 
 56. Murphy, supra note 3, at 4–5; Schlueter, supra note 3, at 208–11. 
 57. Other countries do not place this prosecutorial discretion in the hands of military 
commanders. See, e.g., Boyd v. Army Prosecuting Auth., [2002] UKHL 31 (appeal taken from U.K.) 
(noting that in the United Kingdom, commanders recommend charges to be brought, but high-ranked 
attorneys outside the putative defendant’s chain of command make the final decision as to whether 
charges are appropriate); see also Lindsy Nicole Alleman, Who Is in Charge, and Who Should Be? The 
Disciplinary Role of the Commander in Military Justice Systems, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 169 
(2006) (comparing the command-centered discipline in the United States with Canada and Israel, 
which do not place as much prosecutorial discretion in the hands of commanders but rather in separate 
legal bodies). Scholars have both strongly criticized and defended this commander-based model. See 
generally, e.g., Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., The Case for Military Justice, 62 MIL. L. REV. 215 (1973) 
(rejecting calls for abandonment of the military justice system); Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, 
Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps?, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 481 (1999) (criticizing the current model). For 
a comprehensive discussion on this topic, see Schlueter, supra note 50, at 14–43 (discussing whether 
military justice is grounded in discipline or justice and how this impacts the command-centered 
model). The purpose of this Article is not to challenge or otherwise question the United States’ 
command-centered military system, but rather to accept it as it stands. 
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Constitution itself makes only limited reference to military justice, and 
many of the basic criminal rights were historically not readily applicable 
in a court-martial.
58
 Nothing really prevented commanders from 
improperly influencing a court-martial.
59
 And civilian courts overturned a 
verdict only if there was a jurisdictional problem with the trial 
proceeding.
60
 Legislators and legal academics alike voiced their 
displeasure with this unfettered discretion afforded military commanders.
61
 
This led to some nominal restraints on a commander’s discretion during 
the early part of the Twentieth Century, such as extensive military review 
of convictions and the removal of commander discretion to return an 
acquittal verdict for retrial.
62
 However, a commander’s overall authority 
over military justice remained largely unchecked.
63
  
B. The Uniform Code of Military Justice and Commander Misconduct 
During the Trial Process 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), passed by Congress 
shortly after World War II, did not significantly change the broad 
authority of military commanders over the military justice system.
64
 They 
were still responsible for convening the court-martial,
65
 detailing the 
jury,
66
 and approving any sentence,
67
 as well as negotiating and approving 
any plea agreement with the defendant.
68
 However, Congress finally got 
 
 
 58. See Earnest L. Langley, Military Justice and the Constitution—Improvements Offered by the 
New Uniform Code of Military Justice, 29 TEX. L. REV. 651 (1951); Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara S. 
Hundley, Needed: An Independent Military Judiciary—A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 629, 634 (1994); Note, Constitutional Rights of 
Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1964) [hereinafter Constitutional Rights 
of Servicemen]. Because Article I of the Constitution granted Congress the authority to regulate the 
land and naval forces, the traditional rights associated with a criminal trial (under the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments) were not automatically applicable to courts-martial. See Swaim v. United States, 
165 U.S. 553 (1897); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 137–38 (1866); Constitutional Rights of 
Servicemen, supra, at 129. 
 59. West, supra note 50, at 2. This unfettered discretion was for many years “viewed as a 
military matter, to be resolved by the military departments, or if necessary, by the Congress through 
corrective legislation. The military, in turn, accepted their prerogatives in this regard as absolutely 
moral, and as vital to the maintenance of military discipline.” Id. 
 60. Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); West, supra note 50, at 14–15. 
 61. West, supra note 50, at 37–38. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See UCMJ arts. 1–146. 
 65. Id. arts. 22–23. 
 66. Id. art. 25(d)(2). 
 67. Id. art. 60.  
 68. The UCMJ itself does not address pretrial agreements, but the Manual for Courts-Martial, an 
executive order sanctioned by the UCMJ and the Constitution generally, makes clear that commanders 
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serious about regulating commander accountability and ensuring that 
defendants receive a level of due process in military courts.
69
 In this way, 
the bill became a watershed moment. It finally gave military defendants 
the same kind of due process protections already afforded to their civilian 
counterparts.
70
 Among other things, the UCMJ prohibited compulsory 
self-incrimination;
71
 barred the imposition of cruel and unusual 
punishment;
72
 allowed defendants to compel testimony of witnesses and 
production of evidence on their behalf;
73
 protected against double 
jeopardy;
74
 required independent trial judges, defense counsel, and 
prosecutors;
75
 and created extensive appellate review with civilian 
oversight.
76
 Most relevant for our purposes, Congress also passed Article 
37 of the UCMJ, which specifies: 
Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court 
 (a) No authority convening a general, special, or summary court-
martial, nor any other commanding officer, may censure, 
reprimand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge, or 
counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged 
by the court, or with respect to any other exercise of its or his 
functions in the conduct of the proceeding. No person subject to this 
chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized means, 
influence the action of a court-martial or any other military tribunal 
or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or sentence in any 
 
 
who convene courts-martial have responsibility in entering into and approving any pretrial agreement 
with the defendant. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; UCMJ art. 36 (discussing authority of president 
to promulgate additional procedural and evidentiary rules); JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY 
JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, at R.C.M. 705 (2012), amended by Exec. 
Order No. 13,593, 3 C.F.R. 13593 (2012) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL]; see also 
United States v. Allen, 25 C.M.R. 8 (C.M.A. 1957) (discussing authority of commander in pretrial 
agreements); Major Michael E. Klein, United States v. Weasler and the Bargained Waiver of Unlawful 
Command Influence Motions: Common Sense or Heresy?, THE ARMY LAW., Feb. 1998, at 3, 5–6 
(discussing history of pretrial agreements in the military). 
 69. See Lieutenant James D. Harty, Unlawful Command Influence and Modern Military Justice, 
36 NAVAL L. REV. 231, 232 (1986); West, supra note 50, at 63–83. 
 70. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral Review of Court-
Martial Convictions, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 40, 56–57 (1961). 
 71. UCMJ art. 31. 
 72. Id. art. 55. 
 73. Id. arts. 46–47. 
 74. Id. art. 44. 
 75. Id. art. 26 (specifying that commanders cannot be in the chain of command of military judges 
such that they have authority to review their performance); id. art. 27 (specifying that the respective 
Secretaries of the branches shall set the procedures to assign counsel and prosecutors for a court-
martial); see also infra note 288 and accompanying text.  
 76. UCMJ arts. 59–76. 
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case, or the action of any convening, approving, or reviewing 
authority with respect to his judicial acts.
77
 
The provision is broadly worded and applies to commanders and other 
military personnel alike.
78
 The basic rationale for the law, as one military 
court puts it, is “that every person tried by court-martial is entitled to have 
his guilt or innocence, and his sentence, determined solely upon the 
evidence presented at trial, free from all unlawful influence exerted by 
military superiors or others.”79 Put differently, the statute’s aim is to 
ensure that a soldier’s procedural due process rights are protected.80 In the 
military, this means separating lawful command influence, which is a 
necessary part of military life, from unlawful command influence, which 
consists of “influenc[ing] decisions that should be independent of 
command prerogatives and policy.”81 This type of improper influence 
“corrupt[s] . . . the truth-seeking function of the trial process.”82  
This separation is not always easy. Commanders are expected to 
influence subordinates in order to achieve mission goals.
83
 As one scholar 
puts it, “to best understand lawful command influence, one must first 
understand unlawful command influence.”84 In its most straightforward 
application, the latter is an attempt by a commander to influence an 
outcome of a case “somewhat analogous to the common law crime of 
solicitation,” where an individual tries to get someone to break the law.85 
A military court summarizes unlawful command influence as an action 
that “brings the commander into the deliberation.”86 More specifically, 
 
 
 77. Id. art. 37. The terms “general, special, or summary court-martial” refer to varying levels of 
potential punishment, from the most severe to least severe. See id. arts. 18–20.  
 78. See infra Part II.B. It is important to note that the phrase “authority convening a general, 
special, or summary court-martial” refers to commanders generally who have the authority to 
constitute these courts-martial. Only highly ranked commanders can convene general courts-martial. 
See generally UCMJ arts. 22–24. 
 79. United States v. Rodriguez, 16 M.J. 740, 742 (A.F.C.M.R. 1983).  
 80. See United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393–94 (C.M.A. 1986). Military courts often use 
the term “military due process” to designate these statutory rights that seek to replicate the procedural 
rights afforded to civilian defendants by the Constitution. See, e.g., United States v. Vazquez, 72 M.J. 
13, 14 (C.A.A.F. 2013); Constitutional Rights of Servicemen, supra note 58, at 137–38 & n.138. 
 81. Captain Teresa K. Hollingsworth, Unlawful Command Influence, 39 A.F. L. REV. 261, 262 
(1996). 
 82. Thomas, 22 M.J. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83. Lieutenant Colonel Erik C. Coyne, Influence with Confidence: Enabling Lawful Command 
Influence by Understanding Unlawful Command Influence—A Guide for Commanders, Judge 
Advocates, and Subordinates, 68 A.F. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012). 
 84. Id. at 6. 
 85. Id. at 7. 
 86. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 33 M.J. 132, 133 (C.M.A. 1991). 
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courts have used six factors that help differentiate between lawful and 
unlawful command influence: 
(1) the timing of the contact, e.g., the proximity of contact to the 
[defendant’s] case; (2) who made the contact, e.g., the position of 
the officer alleged as attempting the influence . . . ; (3) the type of 
contact, e.g., speech, letter, memorandum, or directive; (4) the 
content of the contact, e.g., what and how it was said, whether 
mandatory, discretionary, informational; (5) who was contacted—
witnesses, court members, military judge, members of the 
command; (6) the reasonable likelihood of prejudice to the accused 
at his trial.
87
  
These factors seek to exclude those actions or comments that are not 
connected to the defendant’s trial but rather squarely relate to a 
commander’s military duties. For example, in United States v. Lynch, the 
defendant—a ship captain—was charged with and convicted of dereliction 
of duty and negligence in steering his ship into rocks, causing flooding and 
severe damage to the vessel.
88
 The Commandant of the Coast Guard (in his 
capacity as commander of all Coast Guard personnel) shortly after the 
incident made general comments to all captains in the area on the 
importance of taking responsible actions and conducting effective training 
to prevent such incidents.
89
 At trial, relying on the aforementioned factors, 
the judge denied the defendant’s motion that these comments constituted 
unlawful command influence. The nature of the comments (safety versus 
disciplinary focused), the timing of the comments (six months before 
trial), and the lack of any prejudice all suggested that these statements 
were lawful comments relating to performance of military duties.
90
 
Overall, however, these factors do suggest a potential wide sweep of the 
doctrine and the need for commanders to be careful in discussing certain 
topics.
91
  
In order to come under the purview of Article 37, military personnel 
must make their remarks in their official capacity. United States v. 
 
 
 87. United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 592 (N.M.C.M.R. 1990) (citations omitted). 
 88. United States v. Lynch, 35 M.J. 579, 582 (C.G.C.M.R. 1992), decision set aside on other 
grounds, 39 M.J. 223 (C.M.A. 1994). 
 89. Lynch, 35 M.J. at 583.  
 90. Id. at 585. 
 91. See Coyne, supra note 83, at 19–24 (discussing various topics where commanders should be 
particularly careful and providing advice on making statements in order to prevent claims of unlawful 
command influence).  
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Stombaugh provides a good example of this requirement.
92
 There, a 
potential witness—a junior officer—was allegedly told by other officers in 
an informal command group that he should not testify on behalf of the 
defendant.
93
 The court found that the group was not speaking for the 
command or in any official capacity, and thus the conduct did not fall 
under Article 37.
94
 Rather, this was an informal group consisting of junior 
officers who decided on their own to associate with each other.
95
 Any 
advice from its members was personal in nature and thus not with the 
mantle of authority.  
This prohibition of command influence only applies to the adjudicative, 
not accusatory, phase of trial.
96
 In other words, a commander’s charging 
decisions are typically not within Article 37’s purview unless they 
somehow impact a defendant’s eventual trial. Here, commanders, like their 
civilian prosecutor counterparts, have wide discretion on who should be 
prosecuted and what charges should be brought. Both are only restricted 
by the narrow constitutional restraints of selective or vindictive 
prosecution.
97
 Once the charges have become official, however, Article 37 
 
 
 92. United States v. Stombaugh, 40 M.J. 208 (C.M.A. 1994). 
 93. Id. at 210. 
 94. Id. at 212–13. The court noted, however, that this may constitute unlawful interference with a 
witness. Id. at 213. 
 95. Id. at 212–13. This type of informal organization is quite common in air squadrons. Id.  
 96. United States v. Weasler, 43 M.J. 15 (C.M.A. 1997); United States v. Bramel, 29 M.J. 958 
(A.C.M.R. 1990); United States v. Drayton, 39 M.J. 871 (A.C.M.R. 1994); see also Lieutenant 
Colonel Lawrence Morris, “This Better Be Good”: The Courts Continue to Tighten the Burden in 
Unlawful Command Influence Cases, THE ARMY LAW., May 1998, at 49, 54. 
 97. Vindictive prosecution—enforced through due process rights—typically involves a situation 
where the government brings charges based on animus toward the defendant (e.g., the defendant fails 
to plead guilty or otherwise cooperate). See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) (finding 
no vindictive prosecution under due process where prosecutor brought additional pretrial felony charge 
after defendant decided not to plead guilty); United States v. Argo, 46 M.J. 454 (C.A.A.F. 1997) 
(finding no showing of vindictive prosecution in prosecution of officer for adultery where officer was 
initially offered non-judicial punishment but violated additional order); United States v. Martino, 18 
M.J. 526 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984). Selective prosecution—enforced through equal protection rights—
typically involves a situation where the government selects the defendant for prosecution based on 
race or religion or another improper basis. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) 
(basing selective prosecution claim under equal protection analysis must show that the government 
failed to prosecute nonblack defendants for cocaine and crack-related offenses); Argo, 46 M.J. at 462–
64 (finding no showing of selective prosecution where government prosecuted one officer for adultery 
but not another); United States v. Brown, 41 M.J. 1, 4–12 (C.M.A. 1994) (finding no showing that the 
prosecution of a black officer was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination); see also 
Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 
IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001) (noting that prosecutors have wide power to bring charges, limited only by 
selective or vindictive prosecution).  
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kicks in and prevents commanders from improperly influencing the 
judicial process.
98
  
Military courts have invoked the civilian notion of prosecutorial 
misconduct to justify this law. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
(“CAAF”), the highest military court, describes the association in the 
following way: 
A commander who causes charges to be . . . referred for trial [the 
military equivalent of indictment] is closely enough related to the 
prosecution of the case that the use of command influence by him 
and his staff equates to “prosecutorial misconduct.” Indeed, 
recognizing the realities of the structured military society, improper 
conduct by a commander may be even more injurious than such 
activity by a prosecutor.
99
 
The point here is that commanders function like civilian prosecutors 
because they decide what charges, if any, to bring and how to dispose of a 
case. Of course, commanders are not in court trying the actual cases. This 
is left to military prosecutors. Still, as courts and scholars alike have 
noticed, there is a natural parallel between commanders and civilian 
prosecutors and the wide authority they both have over the criminal trial 
process.
100
  
1. Common Examples of Unlawful Command Influence: Interference 
with Witnesses, Jurors, and Court Personnel 
One of the most common instances of unlawful command influence 
involves military juries.
101
 The usual way it enters the picture is when 
commanders, who are designated with the authority to select members 
from the command, either personally or through their staff, improperly 
instruct jurors in anticipation of a court-martial.
102
 Commanders cross the 
 
 
 98. The accusatory stage in the military consists of the time before charges are officially brought 
and a court-martial is convened. See United States v. Weasler, 43 M.J. 15, 18–19 (C.A.A.F. 1995) 
(discussing the difference between preferral or mere forwarding of charges and referral of charges or 
when charges become official). Referral of charges is analogous to indictment in the civilian criminal 
law system. See United States v. Roberts, 22 C.M.R. 112 (C.M.A. 1956). 
 99. United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986).  
 100. See, e.g., United States v. Meek, 44 M.J. 1, 6 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (noting that a commander and 
her staff occupy “quasi-prosecutorial status”); Glazier, supra note 14 (likening prosecutorial discretion 
to commander discretion). 
 101. See Major Martha Huntley Bower, Unlawful Command Influence: Preserving the Delicate 
Balance, 28 A.F. L. REV. 65, 70 (1988). 
 102. See UCMJ art. 25. Using criteria that include “age, education, training, experience, length of 
service, and judicial temperament,” the commander sifts through his command to choose those 
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line when their instructions go beyond simply discussing the rules of 
evidence, burden of proof, and presumption of innocence.
103
 In United 
States v. Littrice, for example, the commander gave verbal and written 
advice on the danger of inadequate sentences and how a juror’s 
performance would be reflected on her employment reports.
104
 CAAF, in 
vacating the sentence and ordering a new trial, found that this influence 
upset the independence of the jury by improperly telling them that lenient 
sentences are inappropriate and that their performance would impact their 
evaluations.
105
 The pervasive risk of jury taint has led scholars and 
legislators alike to criticize this structure and advocate for the elimination 
of commander-controlled jury selection.
106
  
Another frequent example of unlawful command influence occurs 
when a commander (directly or indirectly) interferes with a witness’s 
testimony and, as a result, prevents favorable evidence from being 
introduced at the defendant’s trial.107 For instance, in United States v. 
Levite, on behalf of his commander, a soldier called a meeting of potential 
witnesses to an upcoming trial and provided evidence of the defendant’s 
“bad character” from his service record.108 CAAF found that this conduct 
constituted unlawful command influence that prejudiced the defendant’s 
trial because the commander—through the actions of his subordinate—
improperly intimidated witnesses, thereby preventing them from testifying 
on behalf of the defendant.
109
 The influence over potential witnesses need 
 
 
members “best qualified” to serve on the court-martial panel. Id. art. 25(d)(2); Bower, supra note 101, 
at 70. Commanders may also engage in unlawful command influence if they deliberately stack the 
pool of potential jurors to disfavor the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Hilow, 32 M.J. 439 
(C.M.A. 1991). 
 103. See, e.g., UCMJ art. 37; United States v. Littrice, 3 C.M.A. 487, 492 (1953). Indeed, this was 
the central evil Congress tried to combat by passing Article 37. See Government’s Answer to Final 
Brief at 35–39, United States v. Yslava, 18 M.J. 670 (A.C.M.R. 1984) (No. 50,410), set aside by 23 
M.J. 159 (C.M.A. 1986). “The principal concern of the witnesses at the congressional hearings on the 
proposed Uniform Code of Military Justice was the potential for abuse by convening authorities of 
their considerable power over [jurors’] careers in order to influence the outcome of a court-martial.” 
Id. at 35. 
 104. Littrice, 3 C.M.A. at 491–95.  
 105. Id.  
 106. E.g., Major James T. Hill, Achieving Transparency in the Military Panel Selection Process 
with the Preselection Method, 205 MIL. L. REV. 117, 127 (2010). One proposed alternative is the 
random selection of jurors. See id.; THE HONORABLE WALTER T. COX III ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF 
MILITARY JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNIFORM CODE 
OF MILITARY JUSTICE 7 (2001), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Cox-
Commission-Report-2001.pdf.  
 107. See United States v. Gleason, 43 M.J. 69, 73–75 (C.A.A.F. 1995); United States v. Singleton, 
41 M.J. 200, 204–07 (C.M.A. 1994). 
 108. United States v. Levite, 25 M.J. 334, 335–36 (C.M.A. 1987). 
 109. Id. at 340. 
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not be explicit. In another case, the commander—by calling the defense 
counsel the enemy, placing the defendant in pretrial confinement, and 
authorizing unexplained inspections of the barracks—created a “chilling 
effect” on witnesses who were contemplating testifying on behalf of the 
defendant.
110
 Commanders can also improperly influence defense counsel 
or judges in their official capacity as participants in the military justice 
system.
111
 
A commander’s intent is not relevant to the analysis of a claim of 
unlawful command influence. For example, inadvertent actions can 
equally give rise to violations of Article 37.
112
 As a CAAF decision puts it, 
“when an unlawful act of a commander . . . proximately causes coercion or 
other unlawful influence upon a case, that case has been tainted by 
unlawful command influence” even if the commander did not specifically 
intend that influence upon the case.
113
 This feature seems to underscore a 
focus on procedural protections and the integrity of the system, regardless 
of a commander’s state of mind. In fact, good intentions can lead to a case 
of improper influence. In one case, a commander gave what he thought 
were appropriate verbal instructions on sentencing considerations to a 
large audience.
114
 CAAF, in finding an instance of unlawful command 
influence, nonetheless concluded that some soldiers could have 
misunderstood the advice, thereby causing potential bias in the 
defendant’s trial.115  
Command influence can infect trial proceedings even if the commander 
remains silent and does nothing to promote a particular position. The 
simple fact that a commander’s opinion enters the trial process can create a 
successful claim of unlawful command influence. In United States v. 
Fowle, the military prosecutor read jurors a Navy commander instruction 
that discussed separation from the military as an appropriate disposition 
for larceny cases.
116
 There was no evidence that the commander instructed 
the prosecutor to introduce the evidence.
117
 Nevertheless, CAAF found 
that introduction of this command directive constituted unlawful command 
 
 
 110. See Gleason, 43 M.J. at 72–73 (citation omitted).  
 111. UCMJ art. 37(a); United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (unlawful command 
influence over military judge); United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1993) (unlawful 
command influence over defense counsel).  
 112. Hollingsworth, supra note 81, at 264 n.26.  
 113. United States v. Jameson, 33 M.J. 669, 673 (N.M.C.C.M.R. 1991).  
 114. United States v. Treakle, 18 M.J. 646, 649–52 (A.C.M.R. 1984). 
 115. Id. at 650, 658–59. 
 116. The instruction was a Secretary of Navy Instruction, which would also fall under the purview 
of Article 37. United States v. Fowle, 7 C.M.A. 349, 350–52 (1956); see also infra Part I.B.3. 
 117. Fowle, 7 C.M.A. at 351. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1420 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:1401 
 
 
 
 
influence because it likely tainted the jury’s independent decision-making 
role after their sentence included a discharge from the military.
118
 These 
cases suggest that unlawful command influence can arise in a variety of 
ways, and a commander must be vigilant to make sure she doesn’t make 
comments or take actions that could taint a defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.
119
 
2. Commanders Influencing Commanders 
The potential reach of unlawful command influence goes beyond the 
actions of the specific commander who brings the charges to trial. 
Commanders themselves can be victims of unlawful command influence 
by their superior officers. The UCMJ prescribes that “[e]ach commander 
in the chain of command has independent . . . discretion to dispose of 
offenses within the limits of that authority.”120 The rationale for this 
independence centers on the unique nature of military justice and the fact 
that a putative defendant’s specific commander (and not a higher-ranked 
commander) is presumably in the best position to decide what charges (if 
any) should be brought and how best to dispose of them in light of keeping 
good order and discipline within the command.
121
 Unlawful command 
influence jeopardizes this independence in two primary ways. In the first, 
a superior commander—after her subordinate officially drafts charges 
against a defendant—coerces the subordinate to withdraw the charges and 
bring additional charges with the potential for a more severe sentence.
122
 
The second way involves plea negotiations. Unlike in the civilian 
justice system, commanders, not prosecutors, have the sole authority of 
entering into and approving any pretrial agreement.
123
 Military prosecutors 
serve more as advocates for or advisors to commanders.
124
 Improper 
 
 
 118. Id. at 351–52. Other court personnel (without explicit direction from a commander) can also 
improperly influence jurors by introducing command policy into the trial proceeding. See, e.g., United 
States v. Grady, 15 M.J. 275 (C.M.A. 1983) (defense counsel improperly referred to command drug 
rehabilitation program during voir dire). 
 119. See Bower, supra note 101, at 76.  
 120. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 68, at R.C.M. 306(a) (“Discussion”). 
 121. See supra Part I.A. 
 122. See, e.g., United States v. Haagenson, 52 M.J. 34 (C.A.A.F. 1999). While a commander 
could technically commit misconduct by coercing her subordinate to bring more lenient charges—an 
instance of usurping the latter’s independent authority—this would not, as a practical matter, be 
litigated, because the defendant would not be prejudiced. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 123. Note, Prosecutorial Power and the Legitimacy of the Military Justice System, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 937, 947–48 (2010) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Power]; see also supra note 68 and accompanying 
text. 
 124. Prosecutorial Power, supra note 123, at 949.  
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command influence can arise when superior officers pressure their 
subordinate commanders to reject or otherwise modify plea deals to the 
detriment of the defendant.
125
  
3. Civilian Leadership and Unlawful Command Influence 
Military courts have suggested that civilian leaders may also fall under 
the purview of Article 37. It would appear that the Secretaries of the 
respective military branches, the Secretary of Defense, and even the 
President have the potential to impermissibly influence a court-martial 
proceeding.
126
 Two recent incidents coming out of the current debate on 
the military’s lackluster response to sexual assault highlight this issue.  
The first involves a military commander who disapproved or 
suspended findings of guilt following a court-martial for sexual assault.
127
 
This outraged many senior leaders and legislators.
128
 The Secretary of 
Defense, Secretary of the Navy, and President all made public statements 
emphasizing the seriousness of sexual assault and the need to punish those 
who are found guilty.
129
 Defense Secretary Panetta, in 2012, made 
statements stressing the importance of holding soldiers accountable for 
this type of conduct.
130
 In 2013, President Obama went further and 
publicly said that anyone found guilty should be “prosecuted, stripped of 
[his or her] position[], court-martialed, fired, dishonorably discharged. 
Period.”131 Because Obama serves as the Commander in Chief, his actions 
led a number of military defense attorneys to raise the specter of unlawful 
command influence in numerous pending sexual assault courts-martial.
132
 
One military trial judge in Hawaii found that the President’s specific 
 
 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Villareal, 52 M.J. 27, 30 (C.A.A.F. 1999). A superior commander 
could also technically contravene this independence by coercing her subordinate commander to 
modify a plea deal favorable to the defendant. See supra note 122. 
 126. See, e.g., United States v. Fowle, 7 C.M.A. 349, 350–52 (1956).  
 127. See Findings and Conclusions re: Defense Motion to Dismiss for Unlawful Command 
Influence, United States v. Johnson, N.-M. Trial Judiciary, Haw. Jud. Cir. (June 12, 2013), available at 
http://stripes.com/polopoly_fs/1.225981.1371237097!/menu/standard/file/johnson-uci-ruling.pdf 
[hereinafter Findings in United States v. Johnson (June 12, 2013)]. Recent changes to the UCMJ have 
severely narrowed a commander’s authority to grant post-trial clemency relief. See UCMJ art. 
60(c)(2)(B); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127 Stat. 
672, 955–57 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 860(c) (2014)).  
 128. Findings in United States v. Johnson (June 12, 2013), supra note 127, at 1–3. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 2. 
 131. Id. at 3. 
 132. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Hagel Tries to Blunt Effect of Obama Words on Sexual Assault 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/us/politics/hagel-tries-to-
blunt-effect-of-obama-words-on-sex-assault-cases.html?_r=0. 
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declaration—unlike the general remarks of the Secretary of Defense—
might have improperly influenced the commander in exercising his 
discretion or could potentially taint prospective jurors.
133
 Other trial judges 
raised similar concerns.
134
 In response, Secretary Hagel made the 
unprecedented move of issuing a curative instruction in an effort to blunt 
the effect of the President’s remarks.135 He admonished “all military 
personnel who are involved in any way in the military justice process to 
exercise their independent and professional judgment” and stated that 
“each military justice case must be resolved on its own facts.”136  
A more recent incident that received significant press involved a 
potentially broader reach of unlawful command influence. In a closely 
watched case, a high-ranking officer was accused of adultery and sexual 
assault.
137
 During plea negotiations, the prosecution sent the commander 
responsible for bringing the charges a letter outlining the reasons why he 
should reject the plea offer. One of the stated reasons was the potential 
political fallout from not prosecuting the senior officer, as members of 
Congress had been critical of the Pentagon for not doing enough to crack 
down on sexual assault.
138
 The commander thereafter rejected the plea 
deal. Once the details of the letter surfaced, the trial judge ruled that the 
commander’s decision to reject the plea might have been improperly 
influenced by political considerations rather than based solely on the facts 
of the case.
139
 The trial judge remanded the case to a different commander, 
after which a plea deal was finally reached.
140
 What makes this case so 
interesting is the nature of the supposed pressure. It would appear that 
generalized political pressure—even if not coming from a specific superior 
commander or civilian leader—can be sufficient to constitute unlawful 
command influence and undermine a commander’s independent 
discretion.
141
  
 
 
 133. Findings in United States v. Johnson (June 12, 2013), supra note 127, at 11–13. 
 134. See Steinhauer, supra note 132.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Commentary, Chuck Hagel, From the Secretary of Defense: The Integrity of the Military 
Justice Process (Aug. 13, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/J96B-3B3Y.  
 137. See Alan Blinder & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Faulting Army, Judge Puts Off Assault Case, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/11/us/judge-in-generals-assault-case-weighs-
claim-that-prosecution-was-tainted.html?_r=0. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See id. 
 140. See Jennifer Hlad, Sinclair Reprimanded, Fined; Case Likely to Reignite Battle Over Military 
Justice, STARS & STRIPES (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.stripes.com/news/army/sinclair-reprimanded-
fined-case-likely-to-reignite-battle-over-military-justice-1.273689, archived at https://perma.cc/GPK5-
TUM5. 
 141. Unlawful command influence may also occur in the military commission context. See, e.g., 
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4. Burden of Proof and Prejudice to the Defendant 
A defendant can make an allegation of unlawful command influence at 
any point during trial or on appellate review.
142
 Even if not raised for the 
first time until appeal, the claim is never waived and the burden of proof 
remains the same.
143
 The defendant carries the initial burden of raising an 
unlawful command issue, but the government carries the ultimate burden 
of persuasion.
144
 Specifically, the defendant must “(1) allege[] sufficient 
facts which, if true, constitute unlawful command influence; (2) show that 
the proceedings were unfair; and (3) show that the unlawful command 
influence was the proximate cause of that unfairness.”145 Courts require 
more than mere speculation or allegation to satisfy this burden.
146
 
Once an issue has been raised, the burden shifts to the government to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that either there was no unlawful 
command influence or that such influence did not prejudice the 
proceeding.
147
 When assessing prejudice, courts balance a number of 
factors, including “the severity of the misconduct, . . . the measures 
adopted to cure the misconduct, and . . . the weight of the evidence 
supporting the conviction.”148 The government may satisfy its burden by 
showing that there was overwhelming evidence of guilt that rebutted any 
prejudicial effect on the findings.
149
 Appellate courts sometimes send 
parties to an evidentiary hearing to gather evidence upon which they then 
decide whether the defendant was prejudiced by commander 
misconduct.
150
 
 
 
Kyndra Rotunda, Halting Military Trials in Guantanamo Bay: Can the President Call a Time-Out?, 19 
MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 95 (2010). 
 142. Because unlawful command influence cannot be waived, a defendant need not raise the issue 
until appeal. United States v. Blaylock, 15 M.J. 190, 193–94 (C.M.A. 1983).  
 143. See id. at 193 (“The failure of appellant’s defense counsel to contest at trial the manner in 
which the charges were referred does not preclude appellant from raising this issue on appeal. In view 
of the policy clearly stated in Article 37, we have never allowed doctrines of waiver to prevent our 
considering claims of improper command control.”). 
 144. United States v. Biagase, 50 M.J. 143, 150 (C.A.A.F. 1999).  
 145. United States v. Stombaugh, 40 M.J. 208, 213 (C.M.A. 1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Biagase, 50 M.J. at 150. 
 146. United States v. Johnston, 39 M.J. 242, 244 (C.M.A. 1994). Post-trial affidavits may be 
sufficient to meet this burden of production. See Hollingsworth, supra note 81, at 268 n.59. 
 147. United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 373–78 (C.A.A.F. 2003); Biagase, 50 M.J. at 151.  
 148. United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 184 (C.A.A.F. 2005)). 
 149. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 396–97 (C.M.A. 1986).  
 150. See United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411, 412–13 (C.M.A. 1967); Hollingsworth, supra 
note 81, at 268 n.59. 
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If the claim is raised at the trial level, the judge has wide discretion in 
fashioning the remedy.
151
 She may give a curative instruction or otherwise 
restrict the government’s ability to present evidence.152 It is important to 
note that—unlike the civilian system—a court-martial consists of an 
adversarial merit and sentencing phase.
153
 Defendants are guaranteed a 
sentencing hearing even if the case is resolved by a pretrial agreement.
154
 
After a guilty verdict (or a plea), the trier of fact hears aggravation and 
mitigation evidence and thereafter adjudges an appropriate sentence.
155
 
Depending on when the unlawful command issue is raised during these 
two phases, the trial judge can appropriately tailor the remedy.
156
  
At the appellate stage, the available remedies are naturally more 
restrictive.
157
 A judge can vacate a finding of guilt if she finds that the 
defendant’s trial was prejudiced by unlawful command influence.158 
Frequently, though, the court is convinced that the merit phase was not 
tainted and thus focuses on whether the sentencing hearing was 
compromised.
159
 In this situation, a judge may order a re-sentencing or 
reduce the sentence on her own.
160
 
Entering into a plea does not prevent the defendant from raising a claim 
of unlawful command influence on appeal. The actual plea agreement 
looks a lot like the one found in the civilian system in that the defendant 
agrees to plead guilty to certain charges and forgo a trial in exchange for a 
more lenient sentence and/or charges being reduced or dismissed.
161
 
However, a military defendant still generally retains her right to an appeal 
and the ability to raise an unlawful command influence claim at that 
time.
162
  
 
 
 151. United States v. Harvey, 64 M.J. 13, 21 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
 152. See Thomas, 22 M.J. at 399; Hollingsworth, supra note 81, at 271–72. 
 153. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 68, at R.C.M. 1001; Prosecutorial Power, 
supra note 123, at 953. 
 154. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 68, at R.C.M. 705(c)(1)(B).  
 155. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Assuming a jury trial, the jury also sentences the 
defendant after hearing the relevant evidence. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 68, at 
R.C.M. 1005–07. If there is a pretrial agreement, the defendant gets the benefit of the lesser sentence. 
Id. at R.C.M. 910(f)(3); Prosecutorial Power, supra note 123, at 953.  
 156. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 26 M.J. 442 (C.M.A. 1988). 
 157. See Hollingsworth, supra note 81, at 271–72. 
 158. United States v. Levite, 25 M.J. 334, 338–39 (C.M.A. 1987). 
 159. See Hollingsworth, supra note 81, at 272. In United States v. Fowle, for instance, the 
prosecutor introduced the command directive during the sentencing phase of trial, and thus the remedy 
focused on the sentencing of the defendant. 7 C.M.A. 349, 351–52 (1956).  
 160. United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 398–99 (C.M.A. 1986).  
 161. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 68, at R.C.M. 
705(a)–(b); Prosecutorial Power, supra note 123, at 950–51. 
 162. See UCMJ art. 66(b) (“The Judge Advocate General shall refer to a Court of Criminal 
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C. Expansion by Courts to Apparent Unlawful Command Influence 
Historically, the issue of public perception was a problem for the 
military justice system. As previously discussed, prior to the UCMJ, 
commanders had unfettered discretion with military justice matters, which 
not only contributed to unjust results but also undermined the public 
opinion of the system.
163
 Indeed, mass protests after World War II helped 
push Congress into making reforms and passing the UCMJ.
164
 
Recognizing the need for the perception of justice—not simply actual 
justice—military courts expanded the unlawful command influence 
doctrine to include apparent unlawful command influence.
165
 It turns out 
that Congress, when it passed the UCMJ, had contemplated the need to 
address both ends.
166
 A member of the congressional hearing stated: “It 
seems to me that first, you must insure a fair trial, and second, you must 
maintain a belief in a fair trial . . . .”167 The first wave of cases interpreting 
 
 
Appeals the record in each case of trial by court-martial . . . in which the sentence, as approved, 
extends to death, dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman, dishonorable or bad-
conduct discharge, or confinement for one year or more . . . .”); see also United States v. Edwards, 58 
M.J. 49, 51–53 (C.A.A.F. 2003); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 68, at R.C.M. 
705(c)(1)(B) (“A term or condition in a pretrial agreement shall not be enforced if it deprives the 
accused of . . . the complete and effective exercise of . . . appellate rights.”); id. at R.C.M. 1110(c) 
(“No person may . . . induce an accused by force, promises of clemency, or otherwise to waive or 
withdraw appellate review.”). However, a defendant may waive as part of a pretrial agreement 
unlawful command influence as it relates to the accusatory stage or the period before charges have 
become official. See United States v. Weasler, 43 M.J. 15, 15–16 (C.A.A.F. 1995); Morris, supra note 
96, at 54. Under this system, defendants can still waive their rights to an appeal as long as it’s not part 
of any plea bargain. See UCMJ art. 61. “This process ensures that an accused can waive his appellate 
review rights only when there is no way for him to get anything in return. Not surprisingly, then, 
appellate review waivers are exceedingly rare.” See John F. O’Connor, Foolish Consistencies and the 
Appellate Review of Courts-Martial, 41 AKRON L. REV. 175, 180 (2008).  
 163. See supra Part I.A; Prosecutorial Power, supra note 123, at 940. 
 164. See Robinson O. Everett, The 50th Anniversary of the Uniform Code: A Historical Look at 
Military Justice, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2001, at 21. The UCMJ was not itself entirely successful in 
improving the perceptions of the military justice system. Congress followed with other reforms, 
including the Military Justice Acts of 1968 and 1983. Concomitant with these changes, the respective 
branches also implemented reforms, including independent chains of command for defense. See 
generally H.F. “Sparky” Gierke, The Thirty-Fifth Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture on Criminal Law: 
Reflections on the Past: Continuing to Grow, Willing to Change, and Always Striving to Serve, 193 
MIL. L. REV. 178, 181–95 (2007) (summarizing reforms to the military justice system).  
 165. See Hollingsworth, supra note 81, at 264. Military courts have also implemented the doctrine 
of implied bias, which mandates that a challenge for cause be granted whenever the presence of a 
certain juror on a panel creates the perception that the proceedings might be unfair. See, e.g., United 
States v. Briggs, 64 M.J. 285, 286–87 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 
 166. See United States v. Cruz, 20 M.J. 873, 880 (A.C.M.R. 1985), reversed on other grounds, 25 
M.J. 326 (C.M.A. 1987).  
 167. Cruz, 20 M.J. at 880 (citing Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings on S. 857 and H.R. 
4080 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong. 87 (1949) (statement of Arthur 
E. Farmer, Chairman, Committee on Military Law, War Veterans Bar Association)). 
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Article 37 quickly followed suit and recognized the value of preserving a 
positive public perception of the military justice system.
168
 Two early 
CAAF decisions express it in the following way: “[T]he court’s actions 
and deliberations must not only be untainted, but must also avoid the very 
appearance of impurity. . . . When such an unhappy appearance is present, 
proper judicial administration often requires reversive action.”169 Further: 
“A judicial system operates effectively only with public confidence—and, 
naturally, this trust exists only if there also exists a belief that triers of fact 
act fairly and without undue influence.”170 
Courts, thus, have adopted a two-part analysis to assess a claim of 
unlawful command influence.
171
 First, they ask whether the proceeding 
was actually tainted.
172
 If the answer is “no,” the next inquiry focuses on 
whether it may appear to have been. Here, the emphasis is on the totality 
of the circumstances.
173
 Courts seek to answer the question “whether a 
reasonable member of the public, if aware of all the facts, would have a 
loss of confidence in the military justice system and believe it to be 
unfair.”174 The term “public” includes both the civilian population and 
military community.
175
 The same burden of proof with assessing actual 
prejudice applies in the case of apparent unlawful command influence. 
The government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the public 
would not find the proceedings unfair.
176
  
Remedies for this type of unlawful command influence violation will 
naturally be different from a case of actual unlawful command influence. 
“Since it is the interests of the military justice system rather than those of 
the appellant which are endangered by the appearance of unlawful 
command influence, the remedy must relate to the interests of the system 
rather than those of the appellant.”177 Put differently, the remedy should be 
logically connected to the public harm and try to restore faith in the 
system, not target the defendant’s particular situation.178 This can make the 
specific remedy tricky, particularly at the appellate stage. Courts have 
issued a wide range of corrective actions, ranging from merely 
 
 
 168. Id.  
 169. United States v. Walters, 16 C.M.R. 191, 204 (C.M.A. 1954). 
 170. United States v. Navarre, 17 C.M.R. 32, 43 (C.M.A. 1954) (Brosman, J., dissenting). 
 171. United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405, 413 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
 172. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 173. Cruz, 20 M.J. at 881. 
 174. United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 590 (N.M.C.C.M.R. 1990). 
 175. See id. 
 176. Lewis, 63 M.J. at 415. 
 177. Cruz, 20 M.J. at 889. 
 178. See Hollingsworth, supra note 81, at 265–66. 
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acknowledging the concern in the opinion to vacating the verdict and 
sentence.
179
  
Public statements by commanders outside the courtroom necessarily 
raise the potential for an appearance of unlawful command influence 
claim.
180
 The previously mentioned controversy surrounding Obama’s 
comments provides a recent example of this problem.
181
 There, the Hawaii 
military trial court decided against ruling on whether the President’s 
statements actually created an instance of unlawful command influence 
that tainted the proceedings. In fact, the judge was presented with an 
affidavit from the commander stating that he was fully aware of the 
President’s remarks but nevertheless exercised, and would continue to 
exercise, his independent judgment during the trial.
182
 Without deciding 
the issue, the court found that, at the very least, the facts raised an 
appearance of unlawful command influence. It found that a “disinterested 
and informed member of the public observing this case would believe that 
the Commander-in-Chief’s statements about the military are significant to 
[a commander who brings charges against a defendant].”183 Specifically, a 
member of the public would draw a connection between the President’s 
comments about a dishonorable discharge and any resulting approval of 
such a sentence by the commander.
184
 Because Obama’s statement 
targeted the sentencing and not the merits phase, the court’s remedy 
focused on this part of the trial. It ruled, as a prophylactic measure, that 
any punitive discharge adjudged by the jury in that case would be vacated 
after trial.
185
   
 
 
 179. See United States v. Salyer, 72 M.J. 415, 428 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (finding dismissal of charges 
the appropriate remedy for apparent unlawful command influence due to forced recusal of military 
judge); Lewis, 63 M.J. at 416 (same); Cruz, 20 M.J. at 891 (finding public disclosure of appearance of 
impropriety in opinion sufficient to restore confidence); United States v. Sullivan, NMCCA 
200800774, 2009 WL 2151157, at *7 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. July 14, 2009) (finding that trial judge’s 
ruling that commander’s attorney advisor could no longer be part of proceeding was sufficient to 
remedy apparent unlawful command influence, and no further remedy was required).  
 180. United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 374–75 (C.A.A.F. 2003). 
 181. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 182. Findings in United States v. Johnson (June 12, 2013), supra note 127, at 12. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 13–14. One could reasonably argue that this case is an overuse of the unlawful 
command influence doctrine, particularly where the commander stated that he was not affected by the 
President’s remark. Any prophylactic measure certainly runs this risk. In any case, the purpose of this 
Article is not to critically evaluate the application of the doctrine, but rather to explain its overall use 
within the military justice system.  
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II. THE (SEPARATE) CASE OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 
A. Civilian Prosecutors vs. Military Prosecutors 
Misconduct by civilian prosecutors may be more familiar to readers. 
The Supreme Court describes the term as “overstep[ping] the bounds of 
. . . fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer in the 
prosecution of a criminal offense.”186 The aim here—not unlike in the 
military system—is to protect the due process rights of defendants.187 
Though not exhaustive, prosecutorial misconduct can include a host of 
conduct, such as withholding favorable evidence from the defense,
188
 
presenting false or improper evidence,
189
 making improper or 
inflammatory remarks to the jury,
190
 or preventing or otherwise interfering 
with witness testimony.
191
 All of these actions would also constitute 
unlawful command influence if associated with commander misconduct.
192
  
Now admittedly, each type of misconduct may sweep more broadly 
than its counterpart in certain areas. Outside the courtroom, for example, 
there are probably more ways a commander can commit unlawful 
command influence than a civilian prosecutor can commit prosecutorial 
misconduct.
193
 This shouldn’t be surprising given the broader 
 
 
 186. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84 (1935); see also generally Paul J. Spiegelman, 
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 115 (1999) (collecting cases and instances of prosecutorial misconduct). 
 187. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (citation omitted) (“[I]t ‘is not enough 
that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.’ The relevant question 
is whether the prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting 
conviction a denial of due process.’”); United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 63 M.J. 372, 378 (C.A.A.F. 
2006). 
 188. E.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 189. E.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 
 190. E.g., United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 118–19 (1st Cir. 2002) (making 
inflammatory remarks to the jury about defendant by appealing to jury’s emotions and its role as the 
conscience of the community); Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 312 (6th Cir. 2000) (making improper 
remarks to jury about defense witness); United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 708–10 (2d Cir. 
1990) (making disparaging remarks to jury about defense counsel). 
 191. E.g., United States v. Lord, 711 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1983) (pressuring witness not to testify at 
trial); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976) (intimidating witness not to testify). 
 192. A commander’s withholding exculpatory physical evidence would certainly constitute 
unlawful command influence as described herein, though the relevant cases on the doctrine typically 
deal with preventing favorable witness testimony. See supra Part I.B. The case of a commander’s 
withholding physical evidence would also likely trigger disclosure obligations on the part of the 
military prosecutor given the commander’s obvious connection to the investigation. See generally 
infra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra notes 83–91 and accompanying text; Parts I.B.2–3, I.C. Of course, civilian 
prosecutorial misconduct does not necessarily have to involve improper conduct only in the 
courtroom; it can occur by coercing a witness or otherwise withholding favorable evidence from 
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responsibility of a commander as a leader of troops and someone who can 
communicate legally binding orders to her subordinates.
194
 On the other 
hand, because a commander is not trying the case, there are more ways a 
civilian prosecutor can commit misconduct through trial errors and other 
related matters (e.g., improper statements to juries or presenting false 
evidence).
195
 Regardless of the potential reach of each doctrine, however, 
the fact remains that both doctrines are concerned with assuring a fair and 
impartial trial.
196
  
Military prosecutors serve a more limited role than their civilian 
counterparts. They do not have the same discretionary authority in 
bringing charges or approving plea agreements.
197
 They are more aptly 
described as advocates for commanders who make the ultimate decisions 
on these issues.
198
 Still, military prosecutors can advise commanders on 
what charges (if any) to bring and counsel them on plea agreements.
199
 
Perhaps most importantly, these attorneys are the ones actually 
prosecuting the case—they conduct voir dire, present evidence and 
testimony, and make opening and closing arguments.
200
 With this power 
also comes the potential for misconduct.
201
 Like civilian prosecutors, 
military prosecutors too can coerce witnesses, withhold evidence, or make 
improper statements at trial.
202
 CAAF describes prosecutorial misconduct 
as “action or inaction by a [military] prosecutor in violation of some legal 
norm or standard, e.g., a constitutional provision, a statute, a Manual [for 
Courts-Martial] rule, or an applicable professional ethics canon.”203  
Military prosecutorial misconduct would seemingly fall under the 
purview of Article 37. The statute does not distinguish between 
 
 
coming into trial. These actions would all be behind the scenes. See infra note 202 and accompanying 
text. 
 194. See supra Part I.A. Failure to obey a lawful order is punishable under the UCMJ. UCMJ 
art. 92 (“Failure to Obey Order or Regulation”). 
 195. This doesn’t mean unlawful command influence cannot be interjected at trial. See supra 
notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
 196. Compare cases cited supra notes 187–91, with cases cited supra Part I.B.1. 
 197. See supra Part I.B. 
 198. See Prosecutorial Power, supra note 123, at 948.  
 199. See, e.g., Richard B. Cole, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Military Justice System: Is It Time 
for a Change?, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 395, 409 (1992). 
 200. See UCMJ art. 38. 
 201. See Captain William J. Kilgallin, Prosecutorial Power, Abuse, and Misconduct, THE ARMY 
LAW., Apr. 1987, at 19, 19–23 (arguing that even though a military prosecutor has limited authority 
compared with her civilian counterpart, the exercise of the authority provides ample opportunity for 
misconduct).  
 202. See id. 
 203. United States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 63 M.J. 372, 378 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (quoting United States 
v. Meek, 44 M.J. 1, 5 (C.A.A.F. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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commanders and prosecutors, nor does it restrict the type of prohibited 
conduct. The second sentence of the Article explicitly states that “[n]o 
person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any 
unauthorized means, influence the action of a court-martial or any other 
military tribunal or any member thereof, in reaching the findings or 
sentence in any case.”204 Military prosecutors—because of their status as 
soldiers—are persons subject to the UCMJ, and the pertinent language 
would include misconduct relating to their responsibilities, since that 
conduct can also interfere with the administration of justice.
205
 Military 
courts have also explicitly referred to military prosecutorial misconduct as 
a subset of unlawful command influence or otherwise associated the two 
terms.
206
  
All of this would suggest that military prosecutorial misconduct should 
be treated in the same way as unlawful command influence using the same 
standard. But that’s not what military courts have done. Instead, they have 
adopted the more lenient civilian prosecutorial misconduct standard when 
assessing actions by military prosecutors.
207
   
 
 
 204. UCMJ art. 37(a). 
 205. See UCMJ arts. 1–2(a). 
 206. United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393–94 (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. Bruci, 52 
M.J. 750, 752 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (“In his first assignment of error, the appellant claims he 
was the victim of ‘unlawful command influence’ arising from alleged prosecutorial misconduct . . . .”); 
United States v. Argo, No. ACM 30830, 1995 WL 686904, at *2 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Oct. 27, 1995) 
(quoting Thomas, 22 M.J. at 393) (“‘Unlawful command influence’ is treated as a subset of 
‘prosecutorial misconduct.’”); United States v. Smith, 33 M.J. 527, 534 (A.F.C.M.R. 1991) (discussing 
prosecutor’s action as either prosecutorial misconduct or unlawful command influence). 
 207. See infra Part II.B. That said, it appears that the military imposes a heavier burden on the 
government when the misconduct relates to the disclosure of evidence. See United States v. Coleman, 
72 M.J. 184 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (finding a heavier burden for government than in a civilian case where 
defense made a specific request for undisclosed information); United States v. Green, 37 M.J. 88, 90 
(C.M.A. 1993) (quoting United States v. Eshalomi, 23 M.J. 12, 24 (C.M.A. 1986)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“We have considered that, in the military, there may be a heavier burden on the 
Government than that imposed upon civilian prosecutors to sustain a conviction when evidence has 
been withheld from an accused.”); Captain Elizabeth Cameron Hernandez & Captain Jason M. 
Ferguson, The Brady Bunch: An Examination of Disclosure Obligations in the Civilian Federal and 
Military Justice Systems, 67 A.F. L. REV. 187, 199 (2011) (footnote omitted) (“[T]he military 
prosecutor [compared with civilian prosecutor] may face a heavier burden to uphold a conviction if 
discoverable evidence has been withheld. This incredibly high standard embodied in the [reasonable 
probability standard] does not have a civilian counterpart; rather, it is a reflection of the expansive 
military discovery rights under Article 46, UCMJ.”). Compare UCMJ art. 46, with FED. R. CRIM. P. 
16. In both systems, these disclosure obligations would generally apply to files within the custody of 
the prosecutor as well as other government agencies (e.g., police departments) that are closely 
connected to the investigation of the defendant. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 
(1995); United States v. Williams, 50 M.J. 436, 440–41 (C.A.A.F. 1999).  
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B. The More Deferential Civilian Standard 
During the early part of American history, civilian prosecutors were 
actually appointed by the court or the governor and, in turn, had little 
independence or discretion.
208
 Not unlike military prosecutors who consult 
with commanders, these early public prosecutors were also required to 
consult with the court or the governor before making decisions.
209
 During 
the mid-Nineteenth Century, this model changed, and state prosecutors 
became elected officials with wide discretion and accountability to the 
public only.
210
 The system of federal prosecutors evolved differently. The 
Judiciary Act of 1789 created the office of the Attorney General as well as 
individual district attorneys to prosecute in their respective territories.
211
 It 
was not until the mid-Nineteenth Century that these attorneys came under 
the supervision of the Attorney General.
212
 The checks and balances 
system was intended to ensure proper prosecutorial functions.
213
 Courts 
and legislators became the primary means of curbing prosecutorial 
misconduct.
214
  
In making a successful civilian or military prosecutorial misconduct 
claim, prejudice remains the key inquiry for courts, no different than with 
a claim of unlawful command influence.
215
 The relevant inquiry similarly 
focuses on whether the conduct impacted the verdict and specifically the 
severity of the misconduct, the strength of the evidence of guilt, and any 
curative instructions.
216
 However, beyond this shared substantive baseline, 
 
 
 208. See Davis, supra note 97, at 449–50 (“Before the American Revolution, the crime victim 
maintained sole responsibly for apprehending and prosecuting the criminal suspect.”). 
 209. See id.  
 210. Id. at 450–51. 
 211. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93; Davis, supra note 97, at 451.  
 212. Davis, supra note 97, at 451. 
 213. See id.  
 214. Scholars have found that this system has not done enough, either at the state or federal level. 
Id. at 453; see also infra Part II.C. 
 215. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Hein v. Sullivan, 601 F.3d 897, 905 & n.4 (9th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Hornback, 73 M.J. 155, 160 (C.A.A.F. 2014). 
 216. Compare United States v. Kasenge, 660 F.3d 537, 542 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting these factors), 
with Hornback, 73 M.J. at 160 (noting same factors). See also United States v. Warfield, 97 F.3d 1014, 
1028 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091, 1098 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Most types of prosecutorial misconduct do not result in 
reversal. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). A narrow group of errors, however, 
called structural errors, or those errors that affect the integrity of the trial, are typically considered 
harmful or prejudicial per se. These can include: (1) complete denial of counsel; (2) a biased trial 
judge; (3) racial discrimination in selection of a grand jury; (4) denial of self-representation at trial; 
(5) denial of a public trial; or (6) a defective reasonable doubt instruction. See Neder v. United States, 
527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999); United States v. McMurrin, 70 M.J. 15, 19 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citing Neder in 
stating that structural errors are per se harmful but that these errors are found in only a limited number 
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the prosecutorial misconduct standard (as applied in the military and 
civilian system) diverges in a number of ways from the unlawful 
command influence standard. The following sections highlight four key 
differences: the role of intent, the lack of an appearance of impropriety 
test, the varying burdens of proof, and the use of appellate waivers in the 
civilian system. 
1. The Role of Intent and the Lack of Appearance of Impropriety  
While the Supreme Court has emphatically said that bad faith is not 
required in a case of suppression of favorable evidence, whether intent is 
relevant in other instances of prosecutorial misconduct (e.g., improper 
arguments to jury, introduction of false evidence) remains an open 
question in federal courts.
217
 Some circuits do incorporate intent (i.e., was 
the action deliberate or inadvertent?) along with the aforementioned 
elements when assessing prejudice,
218
 while other circuits simply focus on 
the impact of the conduct.
219
 When it comes to military prosecutorial 
misconduct claims, courts follow the former circuits and incorporate 
intent.
220
  
This focus on intent or bad faith in certain cases is in sharp contrast to 
claims of unlawful command influence, in which a commander’s state of 
mind is never relevant.
221
 A successful instance of unlawful command 
influence, in fact, may arise in situations where a commander acted in 
good faith or not at all.
222
 This difference highlights the contrasting nature 
 
 
of cases); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, To Err Is Human: The Judicial Conundrum of Curing Apprendi 
Error, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 889 (2003) (discussing structural errors and automatic finding of error). 
 217. See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (ruling that knowing use of false evidence violates due 
process without much explanation as to why knowledge was significant); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963) (intent not relevant in case of suppression of evidence); Spiegelman, supra note 186, at 130 
(discussing role of intent in misconduct claims such as improper arguments to jury or introduction of 
false evidence and finding that this remains an open question).  
 218. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 299 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Carroll, 26 F.3d 1380, 1385–86 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Brown, 938 F.2d 1482, 1489 (1st Cir. 
1991). 
 219. See, e.g., United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487, 498 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 
1993); United States v. Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568, 572 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Anchondo-
Sandoval, 910 F.2d 1234, 1237 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Friedman, 909 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir. 
1990); United States v. Hernandez, 779 F.2d 456, 460 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 220. See, e.g., United States v. Grandy, 11 M.J. 270, 275 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. Rushatz, 
30 M.J. 525, 537 (A.C.M.R. 1990); United States v. Goodyear, 14 M.J. 567, 570 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982). 
But see United States v. Williams, 47 M.J. 621, 625 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1997) (intent not relevant in 
prosecutorial misconduct claim based on Brady violation). 
 221. See supra Part I.A. 
 222. See supra notes 114, 116 and accompanying text.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] UNRAVELING UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE 1433 
 
 
 
 
of how the misconduct is conceptualized. Individual agency seems to be 
part and parcel of most prosecutorial misconduct claims, which explains 
why a prosecutor’s state of mind would be relevant. On the other hand, the 
military seems to care only about whether the act impacted the integrity of 
the trial, which explains why a commander’s personal motivations are not 
important.  
Another key difference centers on the role of the appearance of 
impropriety when assessing misconduct claims. Civilian and military 
courts alike require that prosecutorial misconduct actually interfere with 
the defendant’s rights or otherwise impact the verdict. The appearance of 
impropriety—however egregious—is not sufficient to warrant any 
relief.
223
 As one civilian court explains, “appearance of impropriety does 
not undercut personal rights. And unless an error affects substantial rights, 
it is not a basis of reversal.”224  
2. Shifting Burdens of Proof 
Unlike the case of unlawful command influence, the burden of proof 
for showing prosecutorial misconduct on appeal can change depending on 
the defendant’s conduct.225 There are two basic scenarios. First, if the 
defendant raises the issue at trial or the misconduct relates to constitutional 
errors such as withholding favorable evidence or presenting false 
testimony, the appellate court reviews the conduct under the harmless 
 
 
 223. Dick v. Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192, 199 (6th Cir. 1989) (Celebrezze, J., concurring) (finding 
appearance of prosecutorial impropriety insufficient to overturn criminal conviction in the absence of 
actual prosecutorial misconduct); United States v. McDade, Crim. A. No. 92-249, 1992 WL 187036, at 
*4 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1992) (finding that appearance of impropriety by prosecutor’s conduct must 
prejudice the defendant for relief to be granted); cf. United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1466 
(9th Cir. 1986) (“We have grave doubts whether an appearance of impropriety would ever create a 
sufficiently serious threat to public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process to justify 
overriding Sixth Amendment rights.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(noting that when no claim is made that trial will be tainted, “appearance of impropriety is simply too 
slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification order except in the rarest cases”); United States v. 
Rodriguez-Rivera, 63 M.J. 372, 378 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (holding that prejudice is required for a 
successful claim of military prosecutorial misconduct).  
 224. United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1540 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2111). 
 225. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). At the trial level, the burden is 
typically on the defendant if she makes a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, 
though courts often give curative instructions that are intended to neutralize any potential prejudice. 
See generally United States v. Walker, 922 F. Supp. 732 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing how defendant 
carries burden on various criminal motions); Scott W. Bell, Prosecutorial Misconduct, 88 GEO. L.J. 
1408, 1409 n.1746 (2000) (collecting cases); William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double 
Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411, 492 (1993) (noting that the defendant makes a mistrial motion at his 
own risk).  
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error standard, very similar to unlawful command influence claims.
226
 
Here, too, the government—after the defendant has made some initial 
showing that the misconduct affected the fairness of the trial—must show 
that the conduct did not prejudice the defendant’s rights or otherwise 
adversely impact the proceeding such that there is no confidence in the 
verdict.
227
  
In a second category are those prosecutorial errors made during trial 
that the defendant fails to raise at that time. On appeal, courts review the 
conduct for plain error.
228
 Because the defendant waived the issue, she 
carries the burden of showing that the conduct prejudiced her trial.
229
 At 
that point, an appellate court can correct the error if it seriously 
undermined the fairness or integrity of the judicial proceeding.
230
 The end 
result of the latter inquiry turns out be a more deferential standard for the 
government than the harmless error standard, making remedial relief less 
likely.
231
 This setup puts greater burden on the defense counsel to raise this 
claim during the trial process. 
 
 
 226. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect 
substantial rights must be disregarded.”); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1999) (discussing 
harmless error standard for constitutional and trial errors); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 
765 (1946) (discussing nonconstitutional errors and harmless error standard); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619, 629–31 (1993) (discussing origins of harmless error test); United States v. Erickson, 65 
M.J. 221, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2007); Anne Bowen Poulin, Tests for Harm in Criminal Cases: A Fix for 
Blurred Lines, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 991, 1005–07 (2015) (discussing harmless error standard for 
constitutional and nonconstitutional errors). A select group of constitutional errors are harmful per se. 
See supra note 216. 
 227. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985) (holding that to establish due process 
violation, defendant must first show materiality of undisclosed evidence or false testimony or that 
misconduct impacted trial result); Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765 (noting that the government bears the 
burden of showing that nonconstitutional trial error was harmless); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 24 (1967) (noting that the government bears the burden of persuasion to show beyond reasonable 
doubt that constitutional error was harmless); United States v. Seschillie, 310 F.3d 1208, 1214–15 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (noting that the defendant must make some showing of prejudice for nonconstitutional trial 
error, but the government bears ultimate burden of persuasion); see also Poulin, supra note 226 
(discussing burden of proof on prosecutorial misconduct errors, both constitutional and 
nonconstitutional). 
 228. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights may be considered even 
though it was not brought to the court’s attention.”); United States v. Taylor, 514 F.3d 1092, 1095–96 
(10th Cir. 2008) (noting that defendant’s failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial results in 
plain error analysis); Poulin, supra note 226, at 999–1000. 
 229. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 394–95 (1999); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
734, 736 (1993). 
 230. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997). 
 231. See Fairfield, supra note 216, at 895–96 (footnote omitted) (“In sum, if a defendant raises his 
objection at trial, on review, he will benefit from a more lenient standard of review. Under harmless 
error review, the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion, and an error will be reversed unless the 
reviewing court finds the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant’s 
substantial rights were not affected by the error.”). 
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The same sliding scale burden of proof applies in cases of military 
prosecutorial misconduct and trial errors. The key to how appellate courts 
review errors is whether the defendant objected at trial.
232
 In one Air Force 
case, where the defendant was convicted of possession of child 
pornography, the prosecutor made improper and inflammatory remarks 
during closing argument: he called the defendant a “sex troll” and a 
“perverted Peter Pan,” and asked the jury to put themselves in the victim’s 
shoes, mischaracterizing the evidence against the defendant, among other 
things.
233
 Because the defense attorney did not object at that time, the Air 
Force appellate court reviewed the misconduct for plain error. It found that 
the defendant did not carry his burden in showing that the cumulative 
effect of the statements prejudiced the defendant against the overwhelming 
evidence of conviction.
234
  
3. Appellate Waivers of Civilian Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims 
Civilian prosecutorial misconduct is treated differently than both 
unlawful command influence and military prosecutorial misconduct in the 
context of plea negotiations. Civilian defendants can waive their right to 
an appeal in a plea agreement—something not allowed in the military.235 
The ability of a defendant to waive appellate review is an important facet 
of the civilian model, since nearly all federal cases are resolved through a 
plea agreement.
236
 These appellate waivers in fact also often explicitly 
include waiving any claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
237
 The end result 
is an agreement that very often insulates any misconduct from appellate 
 
 
 232. See United States v. Halpin, 71 M.J. 477, 479 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (placing the burden of proof 
on the defendant to establish that prosecutor’s remarks at sentencing were plain error because 
defendant did not object at trial); United States v. Mason, 59 M.J. 416 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (placing the 
burden of proof on the government to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that prosecutor’s improper 
remarks regarding evidentiary standard were harmless error because the defendant objected at trial 
level); United States v. Chapa, 57 M.J. 140, 143 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (same). Of course, constitutional 
errors, similar to the civilian system, are reviewed under the harmless error standard. See United States 
v. Coleman, 72 M.J. 184, 186–87 (C.A.A.F. 2013).  
 233. United States v. Piolunek, 72 M.J. 830, 840–41 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2013). 
 234. Id. at 841–42. 
 235. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). It would appear nearly all circuits allow a defendant to 
waive appellate or collateral review of a conviction as long as the waiver is deemed voluntary and 
knowing. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing 
Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 223–24 (2005).  
 236. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions 
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”). 
 237. Andrew Dean, Comment, Challenging Appeal Waivers, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1221 (2013); 
King & O’Neill, supra note 235, at 246. 
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review.
238
 It is no surprise that scholars have argued against enforcement 
of such appeal waivers.
239
 Defendants may potentially overcome these 
waivers, but only in very limited circumstances.
240
  
Military courts treat unlawful command influence and military 
prosecutorial misconduct in the same way when it comes to plea 
agreements. Because soldiers have a right to appeal even if they enter into 
a plea agreement, they can raise either of these claims at that time.
241
  
C. The Chronic Problem of Civilian Prosecutorial Misconduct 
One cannot have a discussion about prosecutorial misconduct without 
discussing how pernicious the problem appears to be in the civilian 
system. Various accounts suggest that prosecutorial misconduct is rampant 
in criminal trials, but little has been done to curtail the problem.
242
 This 
 
 
 238. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1061 n.2 (2009) (“Because most criminal 
cases are resolved by plea bargains and not subject to appeal, there is often little opportunity to 
discover prosecutorial misconduct.”); King & O’Neill, supra note 235, at 245–46; Alexandra W. 
Reimelt, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bargains and Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 51 B.C. L. REV. 871, 
887 (2010). 
 239. Dean, supra note 237, at 1226–27 (“Commentators have suggested three additional solutions 
to the appeal waiver dilemma: (1) the courts could use their discretion and refuse to honor plea 
agreements containing an appeal waiver; (2) Congress could ‘prohibit appeal waivers entirely’; or 
(3) the risk of going to trial could be reduced to discourage defendants from accepting plea 
agreements.”); King & O’Neill, supra note 235, at 221–23 (putting debate about appeal waivers into 
historical context). 
 240. Courts have voided these waivers in narrow instances involving a miscarriage of justice or if 
the waiver itself was not voluntary and knowing. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 
202, 210 (1995) (discussing presumption of waivability in plea agreements and need for some 
affirmative indication that agreement was entered into unknowingly and involuntarily); United States 
v. Smith, 413 F.3d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that valid plea agreement and appellate waiver 
must be entered into knowingly and voluntarily); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 
2003) (explaining the various factors in miscarriage of justice and concluding that “[a]lthough we have 
not provided an exhaustive list of the circumstances that might constitute a miscarriage of justice, we 
recognize that these [appellate] waivers are contractual agreements between a defendant and the 
Government and should not be easily voided by the courts. As such, we caution that this exception is a 
narrow one and will not be allowed to swallow the general rule that waivers of appellate rights are 
valid.”); see also Samuel R. Wiseman, Waiving Innocence, 96 MINN. L. REV. 952, 972–73 (2012). 
 241. See supra note 162 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 46 M.J. 
52, 53–54 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (distinguishing certain evidentiary or procedural rules that can be waived 
from those fundamental rights that cannot be waived); United States v. Bruci, 52 M.J. 750 (N-M. Ct. 
Crim. App. 2000). This result is further bolstered by the fact that military courts typically characterize 
prosecutorial misconduct as a subset of unlawful command influence. See supra note 206 and 
accompanying text.  
 242. Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. 
REV. 629, 631 (1972); James E. Coleman, Jr. et al., The Phases and Faces of the Duke Lacrosse 
Controversy: A Conversation, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 181, 199 (2009) (citing a Center 
for Public Integrity study that found rampant prosecutorial misconduct over a thirty-year period and 
that courts typically do not find misconduct because of the harmless error standard); Alexandra White 
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kind of behavior no doubt undermines public confidence in the civilian 
justice system.
243
  
The motivation for this type of overreach may be the result of a 
prosecutor’s dual role as an officer of the court and advocate for the 
government. As an officer of the court, a prosecutor must make sure that 
only the guilty go to jail, but, as a participant in the adversarial system, she 
is also expected to zealously advocate on behalf of the government.
244
 This 
advocacy obligation and desire to win cases can lead a prosecutor astray 
from her broader obligation of promoting justice.
245
 
The problem seems to be that the civilian system is not able to 
sufficiently deter overreach by prosecutors. One of the issues is lack of 
punishment for these individuals—either through ethical bodies or civil 
suits.
246
 By some estimates, prosecutorial misconduct is punished in less 
 
 
Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics 
and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 46 (2005) (noting that prosecutorial 
misconduct has tripled in the last decade, according to the Department of Justice); Mark Curriden, 
Harmless Error? New Study Claims Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Rampant in California, A.B.A. J., 
Dec. 2010, at 18, 18–19 (discussing a study by the Northern California Innocence Project at Santa 
Clara University School of Law that evaluated the prevalence of prosecutorial misconduct in 
California and concluded that “prosecutorial misconduct in the nation’s most populous state continues 
to be a problem, and that prosecutors are seldom held accountable for [that] misconduct”); Editorial 
Board, Rampant Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
01/05/opinion/sunday/rampant-prosecutorial-misconduct.html?_r=2; An Epidemic of Prosecutor 
Misconduct 4–5 (Ctr. for Prosecutor Integrity White Paper), available at http://www.prosecutor 
integrity.org/wp-content/uploads/EpidemicofProsecutorMisconduct.pdf (citing scholars and public 
opinion as to the potentially widespread instances of prosecutorial misconduct); Sidney Powell, 
Breaking: Ninth Circuit Panel Suggests Perjury Prosecution for Lying Prosecutors, N.Y. OBSERVER 
(Jan. 1, 2015, 10:26 PM), http://observer.com/2015/01/breaking-ninth-circuit-panel-suggests-perjury-
prosecution-for-lying-prosecutors/#ixzz3PZYIpbuf, archived at https://perma.cc/N87G-893Y. But see 
Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 832 
n.451 (1999) (arguing that misconduct itself may not be as widespread as some scholars think). 
 243. See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, What You See Is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of 
Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 700 (1998). 
 244. See United States v. Francis, 170 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that prosecutors 
must be both protectors of fairness and zealous advocates for the government); United States v. 
Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 1998) (same); Ross Galin, Note, Above the Law: The 
Prosecutor’s Duty to Seek Justice and the Performance of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1267–68 (2000) (“Many courts and legal scholars view the role of the 
prosecutor as having two separate, yet equal parts: a duty to convict the guilty and a duty to seek 
justice.”). 
 245. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 
HOW. L.J. 475 (2006); The Editors, When Prosecutors Step Over the Line, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2009, 
4:34 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/01/when-prosecutors-step-over-the-line/ 
(David Alan Sklansky on “Divided Roles and Allegiances”); Burke E. Strunsky, Why Good 
Prosecutors Do Bad Things: Pending California Legislation on Prosecutorial Misconduct, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/burke-e-strunsky/why-good-
prosecutors-do-b_b_5855684.html, archived at https://perma.cc/5YCY-GMQD. 
 246. Henning, supra note 242, at 829 (citing scholars who found that few prosecutors are 
sanctioned by disciplinary authorities); Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for 
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than two percent of cases.
247
 The other contributing factor, and the primary 
focus of this Article, is the deferential standard appellate courts use in 
assessing this type of misconduct during a defendant’s appeal. Reversal is 
rare, and the standard allows many instances of misconduct to go 
unchecked.
248
 As Professor Adam Gershowitz states, “even when 
defendants can point to a constitutional violation, they still must face the 
difficult task of pointing to identifiable prejudice they have suffered 
because of the violation.”249 Professor Bennett Gershman finds that this 
deferential standard has “unleash[ed] prosecutors from the restraining 
threat of appellate reversal” and that as a result, “many defendants have 
had their convictions affirmed despite clear prosecutorial overreaching.”250  
Even judges have weighed in on the issue. Judge Alex Kozinski, in a 
recent dissent, chastised the majority for upholding a conviction where the 
prosecutor intentionally withheld evidence that undermined the testimony 
of a key government forensic scientist.
251
 He found that the evidence of 
guilt was otherwise not overwhelming and that this action was “not just 
wrong, [but] dangerously broad, carrying far-reaching implications for the 
administration of criminal justice.”252 The case, according to Kozinski, 
effectively tells prosecutors that they can withhold exculpatory evidence 
as long as it’s “possible the defendant would’ve been convicted 
 
 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1517 (2009). Prosecutors currently enjoy absolute 
immunity from civil actions even if their conduct was intentional or malicious. See Connick v. 
Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127–29 (1997); Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U.S. 409, 428–29 (1976). Prosecutors are also rarely criminally prosecuted for such violations. See 
David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why 
Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 217–18 (2011). 
 247. An Epidemic of Prosecutor Misconduct, supra note 242, at 7–8; Editorial Board, supra note 
242. In the military system, Article 37 violations can carry criminal sanctions, though these types of 
prosecutions are extremely rare or nonexistent. See UCMJ art. 98; Hollingsworth, supra note 81, at 
273. 
 248. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 242, at 631; Henning, supra note 242, at 829; Fred C. 
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 
VAND. L. REV. 45, 48 (1991). Indeed, “[a]s many critics of the harmless error doctrine have observed, 
prosecutorial misconduct (and other errors) need not be outcome-determinative to cause meaningful 
harm to the defendant.” Starr, supra note 17, at 30. 
 249. Gershowitz, supra note 238, at 1066. Gershowitz makes another proposal for stymieing 
misconduct that suggests the principle of sibility should be imposed on more senior prosecutors in 
their supervision of junior prosecutors. Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability 
for Supervising Prosecutors: Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395 (2009).  
 250. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 427, 431 (1992); see 
also Carissa Hessick, Prosecutorial Subornation of Perjury: Is the Fair Justice Agency the Solution 
We Have Been Looking For?, 47 S.D. L. REV. 255, 263 (2002). 
 251. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626–33 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).  
 252. Id. at 630.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/5
  
 
 
 
 
2016] UNRAVELING UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE 1439 
 
 
 
 
anyway.”253 Condoning this type of conduct, he concludes, “erodes the 
public’s trust in our justice system.”254  
Scholars have suggested a variety of possible solutions—from the 
extreme to the more modest—to more effectively combat this type of 
misconduct. Some scholars find that nothing short of getting rid of the 
harmless error doctrine will work, and that courts should automatically 
reverse a guilty verdict if misconduct involving a constitutional right 
occurs.
255
 Others advocate for less drastic remedies, such as adjusting the 
harmless error standard so that it is easier to show prejudice
256
 or (moving 
outside the criminal system) allowing defendants to directly sue 
prosecutors for intentional misconduct or holding supervisory prosecutors 
ethically responsible for junior prosecutors.
257
 Professor Sonja Starr 
provides a unique proposal that keeps intact the current prejudice standard. 
She argues that even where there was no prejudice and the guilty verdict 
must stand, the prosecutor’s misconduct should entitle the defendant to a 
reduction in sentence.
258
  
While there do not appear to be any reports on the rate of misconduct 
by military prosecutors, the structure of the military justice system would 
suggest the occurrence of misconduct is much lower than in the civilian 
system.
259
 There seem to be two main reasons. First, because these 
prosecutors don’t decide which cases to bring, military lawyers are 
probably not as heavily invested in the trial and thus less adamant on 
getting a conviction at all costs.
260
 Second, the career path of a military 
 
 
 253. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 254. Id. at 632. 
 255. See Goldberg, supra note 46, at 441–42; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The 
Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARV. L. REV. 152, 167 (1991); 
James Edward Wicht III, There Is No Such Thing as a Harmless Constitutional Error: Returning to a 
Rule of Automatic Reversal, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 73 (1997). 
 256. See, e.g., ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 17–51 (1970); Jeffrey O. 
Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Madness in the Supreme Court’s Harmless 
Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 309 (2002) (suggesting that error analysis should 
focus on effect on jury rather than on whether there was overwhelming evidence of guilt). 
 257. See Alschuler, supra note 242, at 669; Corn & Gershowitz, supra note 249; Margaret Z. 
Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 509 (2011).  
 258. Starr, supra note 17. Professor Adam Gershowitz, while not advocating for changing the 
current standard, advocates that, in addition to remedial relief for the defendant, courts should disclose 
the names of prosecutors in an effort to reduce prosecutorial misconduct. See Gershowitz, supra note 
238. Professor Ellen Podgor suggests that education efforts, both during law school and in practice, 
can help prevent misconduct. See Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in 
Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000). 
 259. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Power, supra note 123, at 951. 
 260. Id. at 949 (“[B]ecause the trial counsel does not choose his cases, he has less of a personal 
stake in their outcomes and less incentive to push the boundaries of the law to obtain a conviction.”). 
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lawyer involves numerous legal assignments, including prosecution, legal 
assistance, and operational law.
261
 Because a lawyer may only serve as a 
prosecutor for a single tour at a time, she may not have the same steadfast 
commitment to the mission that would cause her to succumb to overreach.  
III. EXPLAINING THE CIVILIAN PROSECUTOR AND MILITARY COMMANDER 
MISCONDUCT STANDARDS  
A. Are Commanders Unique or Just In Loco Civilian Prosecutors? 
The military system seems to more heavily scrutinize commander 
misconduct than the civilian system does prosecutorial misconduct. What 
accounts for the difference, as both systems presumably care about giving 
a defendant a fair and impartial trial? It is important to understand here 
that my comparison is with the standard used to assess the impact of the 
relevant misconduct on the fairness of the proceeding, not whether the act 
constitutes misconduct in the first place. As previously mentioned, 
unlawful command influence and prosecutorial misconduct may sweep 
more broadly outside versus inside the courtroom, respectively.
262
 This 
difference, however, only seems to go to whether an action constitutes 
misconduct; it does not provide an explanation for why the military 
employs a more robust standard when assessing unlawful command 
influence compared with the civilian standard for assessing prosecutorial 
misconduct. 
The most logical starting point in explaining the varying standards is 
the nature of the respective systems—one is civilian, and one is military. 
The military plays a unique role in our society as a fighting force, and so it 
makes sense that its criminal justice system—in addition to enforcing law 
and order—should accommodate this combat function. No one would 
argue against this critical difference between the military and the rest of 
society. But it is not clear why the military’s unique mission would 
necessarily mandate a different misconduct standard from the civilian 
system. The military justice system already contains key differences to 
account for its unique mission. Most notably, prosecutorial discretion does 
not reside with military attorneys but rather with commanders themselves. 
This is directly the result of making sure the military force maintains good 
order and discipline—something not necessary for the civilian 
 
 
 261. See U.S. NAVY, GUIDE TO THE U.S. NAVY JAG CORPS 6–7 (2012), available at 
http://www.jag.navy.mil/careers_/careers/docs/JAG_Guide(May%202012).pdf.  
 262. See supra notes 193–95 and accompanying text.  
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population.
263
 There are other procedural and evidentiary accommodations 
unique to the military justice system given its singular mission. To name 
just a few: commanders can dispose of charges through non-judicial 
punishment;
264
 defendants are allowed to introduce evidence of good 
military character;
265
 and defendants have the ability to raise an 
“obedience to order” defense to a crime.266 That said, where military-
specific needs are not implicated, the two systems are very similar: they 
share most of the same procedural protections, as well as the 
implementation of similar evidentiary rules.
267
 The unlawful command 
influence standard seems to fall into the latter category given its criminal 
justice-related function.
268
 
1. Commanders as Non-Lawyers  
Probably the most obvious, albeit ultimately troubling, explanation for 
the varying standards is that commanders are not lawyers. They don’t have 
the legal training (and thus the corresponding instincts) that civilian and 
military prosecutors may have
269—nor are they subject to professional 
ethical rules. Prosecutors—both civilian and military—on the other hand, 
 
 
 263. See supra Part I.A. 
 264. See UCMJ art. 15. 
 265. See generally MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 68, at App. 22, M.R.E. 404 (“It is 
the intention of the Committee . . . to allow the defense to introduce evidence of good military 
character when that specific trait is pertinent.”); see also Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, 128 Stat. 3368 (2014) 
(limiting good military character evidence in certain crimes, including sexual-assault-related offenses); 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 68, at R.C.M. 1001(c)(1)(B) (allowing, for sentencing 
purposes, evidence of “particular acts of good conduct or bravery and evidence of the reputation or 
record of the accused in the service for efficiency, fidelity, subordination, temperance, courage, or any 
other trait that is desirable in a servicemember”); Nancy Montgomery, Character Doesn’t Count: 
Military Lawyers Lose the ‘Good Soldier’ Defense, STARS & STRIPES, Feb. 16, 2015, at 1–2 
(discussing new changes restricting good military character defense in sexual assault cases).  
 266. See generally Monu Bedi, Entrapped: A Reconceptualization of the Obedience to Orders 
Defense, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2103 (2014). 
 267. Major General Jack L. Rives & Major Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Civilian Versus Military Justice 
in the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 52 A.F. L. REV. 213, 232 (2002) (“The military justice 
system gives service members virtually all rights and privileges that are afforded to citizens who face 
prosecution in civilian courts.”). The Military Rules of Evidence, applicable in military courts-martial, 
are for the most part based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Lieutenant Colonel James B. Roan & 
Captain Cynthia Buxton, The American Military Justice System in the New Millennium, 52 A.F. L. 
REV. 185, 209 (2002). 
 268. This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that court-martial jurisdiction includes 
prosecution of all crimes, even if they do not have a service connection. See supra note 7. 
 269. That said, they have lawyers readily available to them for consultation and advice, suggesting 
that they are not completely removed from the legal perspective. Cole, supra note 199, at 400.  
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are bound by their state rules as well as relevant federal regulations.
270
 
Among other things, these rules often have language indicating that 
prosecutors should serve the ends of justice.
271
 The lack of legal expertise 
together with these external professional rules may help explain why a 
commander’s conduct needs to be more heavily scrutinized than a 
prosecutor’s actions during the criminal trial process. 
But this critical difference raises the question of whether our trust in 
prosecutors’ doing what they’re trained to do has been fully realized to 
justify the more lax standard. The aforementioned rise of prosecutorial 
misconduct seems to suggest otherwise.
272
 Part of the problem is the lack 
of enforcement of professional ethical rules. Rules of professional ethics 
tend to be either too vague or too specific to effectively regulate a 
prosecutor’s behavior where it counts most.273 For instance, while the 
model professional rules specify that prosecutors should “serve as a 
minister of justice,” they do little to define what this actually means.274 On 
the other extreme is the attorney subpoena rule, which restricts the 
circumstances under which a prosecutor may subpoena a lawyer to the 
grand jury to testify concerning a client (a very narrowly defined 
prohibition).
275
 These rules also do not carry appearance of conflict or 
impropriety test standards as found with judicial ethics.
276
 Furthermore, 
even if there is a violation, there is a general consensus among scholars 
that these ethical bodies do little to reprimand or otherwise sanction 
 
 
 270. See, e.g., Michael J. Lebowitz, Anti-War & Anti-Gitmo: Military Expression and the 
Dilemma of Licensed Professionals in Uniform, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 579, 592 (2011) (noting 
that military lawyers are subject to the state ethical rules pertaining to their bar membership); 28 
U.S.C. § 530B (2014) (noting that federal attorneys are subject to both state and federal rules); see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 
(2000), available at https://www.justice.gov/usam/united-states-attorneys-manual [hereinafter U.S. 
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL]. 
 271. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2016) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility 
of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”); Henning, supra note 242, at 727 
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (“This higher duty has been variously phrased to require the 
prosecutor ‘to seek justice, not merely to convict,’ and ‘to serve as a minister of justice and not simply 
[as] an advocate.’”). 
 272. See supra Part II.C. 
 273. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 381, 392–98 (2002). 
 274. See id. at 399; Henning, supra note 242, at 727 (“The recurrent theme is justice, although the 
codes do not furnish any guidance about what that means or even whose perspective determines 
whether a particular result was just.”). 
 275. Green & Zacharias, supra note 273, at 394. 
 276. Some scholars have, for this reason, suggested amending the professional rules to include this 
factor. See Flowers, supra note 243. 
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prosecutors.
277
 The end result is a body of professional rules that does not 
really seem to deter prosecutorial misconduct. 
2. Commanders with Broader Authority than Prosecutors 
The broader authority of a commander over the system compared to a 
civilian prosecutor (and obviously a military prosecutor) may also help 
explain the different standards. Not only do commanders bring and 
dispose of charges, they also pick potential jurors and exercise post-trial 
clemency powers.
278
 In this way, commanders serve quasi-judicial roles 
along with their prosecutorial functions. It is no coincidence that the 
appearance of impropriety is found in judicial ethical rules but not 
prosecutorial ethical standards.
279
 Public confidence in judges may be 
necessary to the trial process in a way it may not be for prosecutors. 
This additional authority over and above their prosecutorial role can 
help explain why commanders too must be cautious of making sure that 
their actions do not create a negative public perception. This expanded 
authority and any related potential fallout may be what military courts 
have in mind when they state that commander misconduct is worse than 
prosecutorial misconduct.
280
 It certainly provides a compelling explanation 
for the stricter standard used by military courts and specifically the 
inclusion of the apparent unlawful command influence test.
281
  
3. Protecting Military Subordinates from Improper Influence 
Another explanation may center on the primary thrust of Article 37. 
The first sentence singles out commanders and prohibits them from 
interfering with the judicial process.
282
 One can read this sentence as 
intending to curtail commanders from unlawfully influencing their 
subordinates. Military structure and efficacy depends on subordinates 
 
 
 277. Green & Zacharias, supra note 273, at 397; Henning, supra note 242, at 829 
(“[C]ommentators point out that the professional disciplinary system has proved inadequate in 
addressing prosecutorial misconduct.”). 
 278. UCMJ arts. 15, 60. 
 279. Compare MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2016). See also Flowers, supra note 243, at 703.  
 280. See United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 393 (C.M.A. 1986). 
 281. Military courts, however, could parse out these various roles and attach different standards to 
each of them. In other words, courts could use the unlawful command influence doctrine to regulate a 
commander’s unique quasi-judicial prerogatives and use the prevailing civilian misconduct standard 
for her traditional quasi-prosecutorial functions.  
 282. UCMJ art. 37.  
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following the orders of their commanders.
283
 But the importance of 
obedience has no place in the military justice system, where defendants are 
supposed to receive fair trials based only on the evidence. Because jurors 
and most of the witnesses at trial will come from within the command, it is 
important to protect these individuals from superiors who may improperly 
persuade or coerce them into thinking a certain way.
284
 As subordinates, 
they may feel obligated or otherwise pressured to agree with their superior 
officer’s recommendation, which may jeopardize their independence in 
assessing the case or providing testimony.
285
 Indeed, the potential of 
commanders’ influencing juries has been a recurring theme in unlawful 
command influence cases.
286
  
The most recent examples of civilian leadership impacting the judicial 
process further underscore the concern over superior/subordinate 
relationships. It is telling that Secretary Hagel needed to issue a curative 
instruction after President Obama’s comments on discharging sexual 
assault offenders from the military.
287
 There was a real worry that these 
comments would either influence or have the appearance of influence over 
military personnel (including commanders, court personnel, and 
witnesses) who serve under the Commander in Chief. Courts have even 
gone so far as to include the threat of political pressure as an improper 
influence.
288
 While this type of influence may not, strictly speaking, 
constitute coercion by a superior officer, it nonetheless represents a type of 
oversight that shouldn’t be interjected into the criminal trial process.  
The foregoing examples do not mean that the doctrine only applies to 
situations involving a superior/subordinate situation. Other cases point to a 
broader application. Courts have invoked unlawful command influence in 
cases where commanders improperly influenced judges and defense 
 
 
 283. See, e.g., Bedi, supra note 266, at 2132–33. 
 284. As previously stated, commanders pick the juries from their command ranks. See supra note 
102 and accompanying text. As far as witnesses, it is quite likely that relevant testimony will come 
from members of the command. There are two reasons for this. First, the crime may involve members 
of the command, and so naturally these witnesses would be relevant to any criminal trial. The second, 
and perhaps more consistent, reason stems from the fact that in the military justice system, evidence of 
good military character can be relevant during the liability and/or sentencing phases of trial. See supra 
note 265 and accompanying text. Members of the same command as the defendant would naturally be 
in the best position to provide this assessment, and thus they frequently are part of one or both 
proceedings. 
 285. It is no surprise that unlawful command influence only requires introduction of commander 
policy or opinion, even if the commander herself did not authorize it. See supra note 116 and 
accompanying text.  
 286. See supra Part I.A. 
 287. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 288. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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attorneys,
289
 none of whom are in the same chain of command as a 
commander.
290
  
These command-based concerns are obviously not present in the 
civilian justice system, where prosecutors have no such similar positional 
authority over jurors or potential witnesses.
291
 This may also explain why 
the military prosecutorial misconduct standard mimics the civilian 
standard.
292
 
4. Historical Development and Related Concerns 
Historical development of each system may provide further 
clarification of the two standards. The military system, at first, and unlike 
the civilian system, did not readily provide defendants with the same 
constitutional protections as their civilian counterparts.
293
 Commanders 
also had wide discretion with little to no oversight. Article 37 changed this 
state of affairs. The point was to create a system that was fair to 
defendants without overreach by commanders. This specific concern may 
 
 
 289. United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (finding that commander improperly 
influenced military judge by forcing her recusal); United States v. Dykes, 38 M.J. 270 (C.M.A. 1993) 
(finding that commander may have improperly influenced defense attorney by entering into sub rosa 
plea agreement). 
 290. See, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel R. Peter Masterton, The Defense Function: The Role of the U.S. 
Army Trial Defense Service, THE ARMY LAW., Mar. 2001, at 1 (noting that Army defense counsel 
command structure “has a separate technical chain of supervision to ensure that a defense counsel 
stationed at a particular installation will not be evaluated or disciplined by the local commander 
responsible for prosecution of military crimes”); see also UCMJ art. 26(c) (prohibiting commander 
from being in supervisory position over military judge).  
 291. There is also no issue of supervisory prosecutors’ impermissibly pressuring junior 
prosecutors in connection with bringing and disposing of charges, since US Attorneys with supervision 
from the Attorney General—not individual prosecutors within the district—are ultimately responsible 
for decisions on what cases to prosecute and how to dispose of them in their districts. See generally 
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 270, § 9-2.001 (“The United States Attorney, within his/her 
district, has plenary authority with regard to federal criminal matters. This authority is exercised under 
the supervision and direction of the Attorney General and his/her delegates.”). This is different from 
the military structure, where each commander has individual discretion in bringing charges and thus 
should not be influenced by higher-ranked commanders or civilian leaders. See supra Part I.B.1–2.  
 292. See supra Part II.A. Military prosecutors may be higher in rank than jurors or certain 
witnesses, but this doesn’t mean that they are in the same chain of command. See, e.g., Detailing of 
Trial Counsel, Defense Counsel, and Article 32, UCMJ, Investigating Officers, U.S. MARINE CORPS 
(July 5, 2013), http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/145657/ 
detailing-of-trial-counsel-defense-counsel-and-article-32-ucmj-investigating-of.aspx, archived at 
https://perma.cc/6FDJ-QP2T. Nevertheless, assuming a disparity in rank, a juror or witness may 
unjustly think that whatever a prosecutor says must be correct, which may color the soldier’s opinion, 
much like in the case of the commander’s opinion. This potential danger bolsters the argument that 
Article 37 and its standard should encompass improper influence by military prosecutors, not just 
commanders who have positional authority over jurors or witnesses. See supra Part II.A. 
 293. See supra Part I.A. 
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explain why the unlawful command influence doctrine relied on systemic 
protections rather than the promotion of defendant choice and reliance on 
prudent command decisions. The general negative public perception of the 
military criminal process during the promulgation of the unlawful 
command influence doctrine also helps explain why courts expanded the 
doctrine to include an appearance of impropriety test.
294
 Courts wanted to 
make sure that the public viewed the system as fair and impartial.  
The civilian system was not saddled with these same problems. Due 
process was already built into the system, so overreach may not have been 
as salient an issue outside the military context. One might suggest that 
post-World War II history, and the 1970s particularly, brought with it a 
very different concern. Broadly speaking, courts seemed less concerned 
about making sure defendants received a fair trial and more worried about 
streamlining the criminal trial process and preventing a prolonged appeal 
process.
295
 The goal was to create verdicts that were final and could not 
easily be overturned. As the Court noted, trials should be the “main event” 
and not simply a “tryout on the road” for later post-conviction 
proceedings.
296
 This overarching concern may help explain why courts 
have not altered the more deferential harmless error standard or a 
defendant’s ability to waive any potential prosecutorial misconduct claims 
during plea negotiations.  
B. The Competing Values of Systemic Integrity and Individual Autonomy  
The foregoing explanations provide a compelling story for the 
divergent standards. Taken together, they reveal two very different 
philosophies when it comes to dealing with this type of misconduct: 
systemic integrity and individual autonomy. This Article uses the phrase 
systemic integrity to refer to fundamental or key prescriptions placed on 
the system intended to serve procedural or substantive ends. Constitutional 
 
 
 294. See supra Part II.C. Some scholars argue that the military justice system still has a ways to go 
as far as legitimacy is concerned. E.g., Bower, supra note 101, at 66 (footnote omitted) (“Three and 
one-half decades after enactment of Article 37 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 
written to eradicate unlawful command influence, the problem continues to raise its ugly head.”). 
 295. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–
95 (1976). Admittedly, these cases dealt specifically with ineffective assistance of counsel and 
restricting habeas relief, not prosecutorial misconduct. Nevertheless, the cases point to a basic concern 
for finality and using the lenient prejudice standard to avoid overturning convictions. Wainwright, 433 
U.S. at 90.  
 296. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 90; see also Michael M. O’Hear, Bypassing Habeas: The Right to 
Effective Assistance Requires Earlier Supreme Court Intervention in Cases of Attorney Incompetence, 
25 FED. SENT’G REP. 110 (2012) (analyzing related Supreme Court cases). 
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or due process restrictions would stand as natural structural protections.
297
 
On the other hand, the phrase individual autonomy refers to procedures 
that promote independent choice or freedom. This consists of promoting 
defendant choice during the trial process, as well as the independence of 
various actors (e.g., lawyers, judges) in the justice system.
298
 
These values are already present to varying degrees in both the military 
and civilian criminal justice systems. Both systems, for example, share a 
host of procedural protections such as the privilege against self-
incrimination, the presumption of innocence, and the high burden of proof 
on the government to show guilt,
299
 to name a few. Together, these 
safeguards exhibit an overall value for systemic integrity. They seek to 
provide unalterable protections within the criminal justice system that 
ensure a fair trial. Similarly, both military and civilian systems recognize 
the importance of promoting individual autonomy. Defendants have the 
choice to plead guilty and forgo trial.
300
 As far as encouraging 
independence among actors of the justice system, trial judges have the 
responsibility to decide whether to recuse themselves with little 
oversight.
301
 This deregulation suggests a reliance on judges to make the 
right decisions. These shared instances of individual autonomy and 
systemic integrity should come as no surprise since these systems come 
from a common adversarial heritage.
302
  
 
 
 297. See, e.g., Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 621 
(2005). 
 298. This value has become central to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in a variety of other 
contexts, including the ability of parents to raise children, the right to travel, and First Amendment 
protections. See id. at 651. 
 299. UCMJ art. 51(c); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483–86 (1978). 
 300. UCMJ art. 45; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (2014); see also Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1913 (1992) (claiming that autonomy 
considerations justify plea bargaining as a manifestation of the defendant’s freedom of choice and 
freedom of contract). It is still up to the trial judge to accept or not accept a guilty plea. See UCMJ art. 
45(b); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970). 
 301. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Some scholars have argued against this 
autonomous decision making and have instead suggested procedures that would place this decision in 
the hands of third-party judges. See, e.g., Major Steve D. Berlin, Clearing the High Hurdle of Judicial 
Recusal: Reforming RCM 902(a), 204 MIL. L. REV. 223, 250 (2010) (“The President should amend the 
recusal rules to allow an independent judge to review a disqualification motion.”); Dmitry Bam, Our 
Unconstitutional Recusal Procedures, 84 MISS. L.J. 1135 (2015) (arguing that self-recusal procedures 
violate the due process clause of the Constitution).  
 302. See United States v. Clay, No. 49, 1951 WL 1512, at *77 (C.M.A. Nov. 27, 1951) (“There 
are certain standards in the military accusatorial system which have been specifically set by Congress 
and which we must demand be observed in the trials of military offenses.”); see also Rogers v. 
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (discussing how coerced confessions “offend an underlying 
principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial 
system”); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940) (explaining that the Due Process Clause was 
intended to guarantee procedural safeguards “to protect, at all times, people charged with or suspected 
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Turning specifically to analyzing misconduct by commanders, 
however, the military’s rules tend to implicitly underscore a value of 
systemic integrity more than individual autonomy. The military focuses on 
permanent procedures and rights that seek to combat or otherwise deter 
commander misconduct. This entails automatically placing the burden of 
persuasion on the government and allowing defendants to raise the issue at 
any point during trial or appeal. Defendants also cannot waive this right 
through the plea process. The collective force of these requirements 
ensures a fair trial for the defendant. Indeed, even if there is no prejudice 
and a commander has acted in good faith, courts—through the apparent 
unlawful command influence test—remain vigilant in making sure the 
public perception of fairness endures.
303
 This facet downplays a 
commander’s autonomy—even if it is administered wisely—in favor of 
promulgating a prophylactic measure to ensure the overall integrity of the 
system.  
The military’s unique history of unfettered discretion for commanders, 
the fact that commanders are not lawyers, and the protection of 
subordinates from undue commander influence further justify why the 
military would set up permanent rules to combat commander misconduct 
without much emphasis on promoting autonomy. All of the above pose a 
real danger of adversely interfering with the judicial process, particularly 
when one recognizes that commanders may have a vested interest in the 
outcome. This concern is even greater after one considers that 
commanders have broader authority over the justice system than civilian 
prosecutors (e.g., they pick juries, grant post-trial clemency relief).
304
  
Civilian treatment of prosecutorial misconduct, by and large, eschews 
these kinds of structural protections in favor of promoting autonomy. I 
qualify this assessment because the civilian system also exhibits some 
element of systemic integrity—specifically, its use of the prejudice 
standard. Like the military system, the key question is whether the 
misconduct impacted the result at trial. From this shared baseline, the 
civilian system seems to favor individual autonomy. In the subcategory of 
defendant choice, burdens of proof vary depending on what the defendant 
does or does not do at trial. Defendants are also in full control of their 
 
 
of crime by those holding positions of power and authority”). The nature of the adversarial system 
itself seems to embody a mix of these two values. See supra note 35.  
 303. Other parts of the military justice system also advance this general value of structural 
integrity. Defendants cannot waive their right to a sentencing hearing, and thus the possibility of a 
lesser sentence, even if they enter into a plea agreement. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 304. See supra Part III.A.3. 
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right to waive an appeal and challenge misconduct claims during plea 
negotiations. Collectively, this focus on individual choice signals a value 
of autonomy when it comes to dealing with prosecutorial misconduct. In 
short, defendants, by and large, can control if and how appellate courts 
will handle these claims. This connection between defendant choice and 
prosecutorial misconduct is indirect. We are talking about two 
independent actions by different actors. The connection between the two 
lies more in how and if the misconduct claim will be resolved, not the 
substance of the misconduct itself.  
This value of autonomy also includes promoting the independence of 
prosecutors in the criminal justice system.
305
 The fact that a prosecutor’s 
intent is typically relevant and that there is no appearance of impropriety 
test suggest an implicit confidence that, absent bad faith, prosecutors are 
adequately doing their jobs, and that no further inquiry on the impact of 
their conduct is necessary.  
The civilian system’s unique evolution further bolsters this emphasis 
on individual autonomy. For one thing, due process protections were 
already in place well before military defendants benefited from them.
306
 
This early structural protection would allow courts greater leeway in 
giving prosecutors freedom to make sure they do their jobs and providing 
defendants the choice to decide how and if misconduct claims will be 
resolved. The historical concern for finality implicitly also supports these 
values. If we don’t want appeals to linger for long periods and verdicts to 
be easily overturned, the natural assumption is that individual actors of the 
criminal justice system—judges, defense attorneys, and prosecutors—will 
do their job at trial,
307
 and defendants will have the discretion to waive 
appellate rights or potentially deal with a more deferential misconduct 
standard.
308
 
 
 
 305. See Máximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 835, 851 (2005) (noting that under the adversarial system, prosecutors and defense 
attorneys have more procedural powers than under the inquisitorial system). The promotion of 
independence of defense attorneys can also be evidenced by the fact that ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims are subjected to the same harmless error standard as prosecutorial misconduct claims. 
See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–91 (1984); Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and 
the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2002). 
 306. Compare Part I.A, with Part II.B. 
 307. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (“[T]he court should recognize that counsel is strongly 
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment.”). 
 308. This notion of defendant choice may also be tied to promoting self-direction and avoiding 
paternalism. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.  
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Furthermore, unlike military commanders, civilian prosecutors are 
legally trained individuals who are theoretically already bound by ethical 
rules. This fact may help explain why civilian courts did not develop a 
stricter misconduct standard or an appearance of impropriety test. Ethical 
rules provide a separate mechanism to deter improper behavior. This frees 
up the criminal justice system to promote the independence and freedom 
of prosecutors. To what extent this reliance may be misplaced remains an 
open question.
309
 That said, for similar reasons, it makes sense why the 
military would, by and large, use the prevailing civilian standard—with its 
emphasis on autonomy—when assessing military prosecutorial 
misconduct claims, as these lawyers are also bound by their state ethical 
rules.
310
  
These competing principles of systemic integrity and individual 
autonomy—or at least some version of them—have actually come up in a 
different criminal justice context. In Faretta v. California, the Supreme 
Court addressed the permissibility of a defendant representing herself in a 
criminal trial.
311
 It balanced the procedural protections of the Sixth 
Amendment against individual autonomy or the defendant’s freedom of 
choice.
312
 The Court found that the Sixth Amendment does not simply 
provide that a defense shall be made for the accused, but also grants to the 
defendant the right to personally make her own defense.
313
 The Court 
specifically focused on the values of autonomy and the freedom of choice 
as a necessary part of our legal system. “[W]hatever else may be said of 
those who wrote the Bill of Rights,” the Court explained, “surely there can 
be no doubt that they understood the inestimable worth of free choice.”314 
The Court seemed to recognize that this type of self-representation may 
not be in the best interest of the defendant and may frustrate her ability to 
present the most persuasive defense.
315
 Nevertheless, the Court found that 
 
 
 309. See supra Part II.C.  
 310. I qualify this statement because the military does seem to impose a heavier burden on the 
government when the misconduct relates to disclosure violations, underscoring a preference instead for 
systemic integrity in this scenario. See supra note 207. 
 311. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 312. Id. at 812–36. This case and the related scholarship did not involve the second type of 
individual autonomy described herein, or autonomy of the individual actors of the criminal justice 
system. Nevertheless, the resulting debate can still highlight how these competing principles are 
deployed in the criminal justice context. 
 313. Id. at 819. 
 314. Id. at 833–34. 
 315. Id. at 834 n.46 (“Thus, whatever else may or may not be open to him on appeal, a defendant 
who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense 
amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’”).  
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“respect for the individual . . . is the lifeblood of the law,” so a defendant 
must be afforded the right to represent herself.
316
 
Scholars have debated the merits of this ruling and whether autonomy 
or systemic integrity should be promoted as a worthier value in the context 
of self-representation. Professor Robert Toone, for example, challenges 
the proposition that “defendant autonomy is a constitutional value that 
trumps, or at least counterbalances, interests such as accuracy, fairness, 
and efficiency.”317 He argues that self-representation has not benefited 
defendants and indeed empowers self-destructive impulses of many 
criminal defendants.
318
 He argues that the rationale behind Faretta and the 
value of autonomy should be reexamined in this context. He seems to 
favor representation, even if the defendant objects to having an attorney 
present. The point here is to provide procedural protections—regardless of 
their impact on the defendant’s autonomy—to ensure that a defendant 
receives a fair trial.
319
 
Professor Erica Hashimoto, on the other hand, finds that autonomy 
should be promoted in the context of representation.
320
 In addition to 
enjoying historical and textual support, she also thinks this makes 
jurisprudential sense.
321
 She explains that defendants should have the 
ability to control their own cases since a finding of guilt will deprive them 
of their autonomy.
322
 This means a respect for a defendant’s autonomy 
during trial, even if it turns out to prejudice the defendant. In making her 
point, she argues that procedural protections promote paternalism, which 
is neither justified by empirical evidence nor consistent with other 
fundamental decisions that allow a defendant to choose whether to go to 
trial or whether to enter into a guilty plea.
323
 My aim here is not to pick a 
 
 
 316. Id. at 834. The Court cited to a defendant’s choice as to whether she will testify at trial as an 
example of how “[f]reedom of choice” was integral to “the constitutional design of procedural 
protections.” Id. at 834 n.45. 
 317. Toone, supra note 297, at 621. 
 318. Toone cites to a number of high-profile criminal cases involving defendants like Colin 
Ferguson and Theodore Kaczynski as instances of self-representation that had disastrous results. Id. at 
628. 
 319. Id. at 638–50. Toone supports his position by relying on the Court’s decision in Martinez v. 
Court of Appeal of California, which denied a defendant the right to represent herself on appeal. Id. at 
627. In that case, the Court found that the government’s interest in ensuring the integrity and 
efficiency of the appellate process outweighed a defendant’s freedom to represent herself on appeal. 
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000).  
 320. See Erica J. Hashimoto, Resurrecting Autonomy: The Criminal Defendant’s Right to Control 
the Case, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1147 (2010). 
 321. Id. at 1163–74. 
 322. Id. at 1173. 
 323. Id. at 1174–78.  
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side but rather to highlight the debate between the two competing 
principles of individual autonomy—specifically, defendant choice—and 
systemic integrity.  
C. Lessons for the Future: Reforming Civilian and Military Misconduct 
Standards  
Turning back to unlawful command influence and prosecutorial 
misconduct, we can ask the same questions as in the self-representation 
scenario. Are the principles of systemic integrity and individual autonomy 
balanced in the right mix when it comes to assessing misconduct claims? 
Going forward, what changes, if any, need to be made, and does it matter 
which system—military or civilian—we’re talking about?  
Take the potentially widespread occurrences of prosecutorial 
misconduct in the civilian system. The problem seems to be too much 
emphasis on prosecutorial autonomy and trusting that these individuals 
will dutifully do their jobs. This approach of self-regulation seems to have 
done little to stymie overreach by prosecutors.
324
 The civilian system 
needs only to look to its military counterpart for guidance on addressing 
this issue. By all accounts, it appears that an emphasis on systemic 
integrity provides an effective mechanism against unlawful command 
influence. The military seems to implicitly recognize that commanders 
serve a variety of roles—quasi-prosecutorial, judicial, military, etc.—and 
the exercise of these competing duties, whether intentionally or accidently, 
can interfere with the fairness of a criminal trial. These risks are not all 
that different in the civilian system, even though we are dealing with 
legally trained individuals who may not have as broad a range of 
responsibilities. Civilian prosecutors are nevertheless juggling competing 
roles as officers of the court and advocates for the government—roles that 
can interfere with a defendant’s right to a fair trial when prosecutors 
become too invested in winning a case. Instead of allowing prosecutors to 
essentially police themselves (as the current system seems to do), we 
should impose restraints that can assure proper exercise of these different 
roles.  
There are a number of potential changes that can be made to the 
civilian system along these lines. In the first instance, given the fact that 
most trials are resolved through guilty pleas, the system may have to 
change the way it handles appeal waivers in plea agreements because of 
 
 
 324. See supra Part II.C. 
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courts’ resultant inability to scrutinize prosecutorial misconduct claims.325 
In its place, and similar to military procedure, civilian defendants who 
enter into such agreements would still have the ability to raise misconduct 
claims on appeal.
326
 But it is worth pointing out that there is an ongoing 
debate as to whether appeal waivers save on administrative costs by 
reducing the number of criminal appeals and thus serving the broader goal 
of efficiency of the criminal justice system.
327
 I do not take a position here 
but simply note that any potential change to appeal waivers in the civilian 
system would have to address this issue. 
Moving beyond plea agreements, the question becomes what 
substantive changes to the prejudice standard are necessary. One extreme 
solution would be to get rid of the prejudice standard altogether, such that 
any finding of misconduct triggers an automatic reversal.
328
 This change 
obviously goes well beyond the military’s unlawful command influence 
doctrine, which maintains a prejudice analysis. A more modest proposal—
as some scholars have suggested—would be to change how the harmless 
error standard is administered so it is easier to show prejudice.
329
 At the 
very least, it seems that we should—in line with the unlawful command 
influence doctrine—get rid of the shifting burdens of proof so that the 
government on appeal always bears the burden of showing that there was 
no prejudice. The current setup, while certainly an instance of promoting 
defendant choice, does nothing to benefit the defendant should she not 
object at trial. 
An effective and easily implemented add-on would be the adoption of 
an appearance of impropriety test similar to the military system. The key 
question for courts would be whether the prosecutor’s actions, even if not 
prejudicing the defendant, would undermine the perception of justice in 
the system if the public knew the circumstances. This measure—especially 
given its disassociation with intent—could help make sure prosecutors go 
 
 
 325. See supra notes 235–40 and accompanying text.  
 326. Defendants could then argue that the misconduct invalidated the voluntariness of the plea. 
See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) (stating that deceptive conduct by 
prosecution may invalidate pleas); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988) (“[W]e 
conclude that even a guilty plea that was ‘knowing’ and ‘intelligent’ may be vulnerable to challenge if 
it was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the prosecution.”).  
 327. Compare United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting speed and 
economy as “chief virtues” of appeal waivers), and David E. Carney, Note, Waiver of the Right to 
Appeal Sentencing in Plea Agreements with the Federal Government, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1019, 
1037 (1999) (“These agreements save the courts untold hours of work, and waivers of appellate rights 
would further reduce the load on an already taxed judiciary.”), with Dean, supra note 237, at 1202 
(arguing that appeal waivers have not reduced the number of appeals). 
 328. See supra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 329. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
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the extra mile to prevent any potential appearance of taint or bias. 
Adoption of this test, just as in the military context, does not mean an 
automatic reversal if the conduct creates an appearance of impropriety. 
The remedy, similarly, would need to be tailored to the interests of the 
system as a whole rather than the defendant. Still, even public 
acknowledgement of the misconduct as violating this appearance standard 
would do more than the current standard in helping deter improper 
prosecutorial behavior.
330
  
Where does that leave autonomy? I think that this value has its place in 
this discussion, but perhaps it should be primarily focused on promoting 
defendant choice rather than promoting the independence of prosecutors or 
commanders through lenient misconduct standards.
331
 Here, both systems 
already allow defendants to bargain away certain rights (e.g., the rights to 
trial and to confront witnesses) in exchange for lighter sentences.
332
 The 
question is how far we should go in promoting this value in the 
commander/prosecutorial misconduct context. Some scholars think that 
the military system can learn something from the civilian system here. 
Currently, a military defendant cannot waive her right to an appeal and a 
potential claim of unlawful command influence—even if she wants to—as 
part of a pretrial agreement.
333
 This restriction, according to Corey 
Wielert, is too rigid and may not sufficiently empower defendants during 
this process.
334
 She argues that giving defendants the choice to bargain 
away this right will support “[a]utonomy and efficiency” of the plea 
bargain process, as it will not only allow a defendant to secure lighter 
sentences, but will also benefit the military in expediting the disposition of 
cases.
335
  
 
 
 330. Cf. Gershowitz, supra note 238 (proposing that publically shaming prosecutors who commit 
misconduct by disclosing their names in court opinions can serve to deter future misconduct). Moving 
outside the criminal justice system, we could make sure prosecutors are held responsible through civil 
damages or do a better job prosecuting ethical violations. See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 
WIS. L. REV. 399, 427; supra note 257 and accompanying text. These solutions would also promote 
systemic integrity, but from the outside of the criminal trial process.  
 331. Some degree of individual autonomy, of course, remains critical to our adversarial system, 
see supra note 36 and accompanying text, but this does not mean that review of misconduct, especially 
by prosecutors, should not be more highly regulated.  
 332. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.  
 333. The defendant is free to waive appellate review (and along with it claims of unlawful 
command influence), but only after a commander acts on her sentence and finalizes it. See supra note 
162. 
 334. See Corey Wielert, Affecting the Bargaining Process in Pretrial Agreements: Waiving 
Appellate Rights in the Military Justice System, 79 UMKC L. REV. 237, 249 (2010). 
 335. Id. at 249–50. While not the subject of this Article, this discussion of the benefits of plea 
bargains assumes in the first instance that these bargains are successful in promoting autonomy in a 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss6/5
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It is not clear whether this would be a favorable change based on the 
civilian experience with such waivers. After all, the civilian system is 
plagued by the fact that most instances of misconduct are not reviewed 
because of appeal waivers.
336
 Allowing military defendants to waive their 
right to appeal could similarly turn out to be counterproductive and shield 
commander misconduct from appellate review.  
In a recent proposal, Professor John Rappaport provides a provocative 
analysis where he takes the value of defendant choice to its natural 
conclusion.
337
 He suggests that a defendant should have the ability to 
unbundle various rights and negotiate for sentencing reductions based on 
piecemeal agreements.
338
 Instead of the all-or-nothing plea bargain 
currently used in both military and civilian systems, defendants could 
negotiate away specific rights, such as the right to confront witnesses or 
reduction of the government’s burden of proof, in exchange for lighter 
sentences.
339
  
The workability of such a piecemeal proposal is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but it can be instructive to our discussion, specifically to the 
issue of appellate review. Even Rappaport believes certain things 
shouldn’t be bargained away, such as judicial impartiality or public trials, 
because these are necessary components of a legitimate criminal justice 
system.
340
 This is simply another way of saying that these features support 
the promotion of systemic integrity. One might argue that appellate review 
of prosecutorial or commander misconduct claims—contrary to the current 
civilian practice—should also fall into this category of unalterable 
protections.
341
 These considerations are not unlike the Faretta discussion 
and the relative importance of defendant choice versus the assurance of 
fairness. To fully assess the value of appeal waivers would require, among 
other things, ascertaining whether and to what extent defendants actually 
 
 
real way. Perhaps, as some scholars have suggested, the structural biases of the system prevent 
defendants from fully realizing the benefits of these bargains. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea 
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2464 (2004); Erica Hashimoto, Toward 
Ethical Plea Bargaining, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 949 (2008). 
 336. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 337. See John Rappaport, Unbundling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 181 (2015).  
 338. Id. at 181–83. 
 339. Rappaport lists a host of other rights (e.g., presenting a defense, the requirement of a 
unanimous verdict) that could be specifically bargained away. Id. at 189–90. 
 340. Id. at 196. 
 341. Rappaport himself does not take a position on appellate waivers, though his argument would 
probably suggest that these too can be bargained away. See id. at 181–99. But see Cassandra Burke 
Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219 (2013) (arguing for a constitutional right to 
appeal). 
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get lighter sentences by entering into them.
342
 Given the lack of consistent 
data on this issue and the competing interests involved, it is not readily 
apparent how this calculus ultimately should be resolved.
343
 What is 
important for my purposes is recognizing how the values of systemic 
integrity and individual autonomy can help crystallize the various interests 
at play.  
These competing principles may also be useful in the controversy 
surrounding how commanders have handled sexual assault cases. The 
issue here is not making sure defendants receive a fair trial, but rather what 
appears to be the lack of prosecution of these types of cases in the first 
instance.
344
 Recent studies show that while sexual assault is rising in the 
military, commanders are not subsequently bringing more charges against 
defendants.
345
 It is not clear if this undercharging arises from a sexist 
viewpoint, since the greater percentage of sexual assault crimes involve 
women victims, or some other type of discrimination against them, or 
perhaps favoritism for the defendant.
346
 Whatever the motivation, the point 
here is that commanders have not effectively administered their charging 
discretionary authority.  
Like their civilian counterparts, commanders are free to bring whatever 
charges they deem appropriate, with little to no restrictions.
347
 And the 
doctrine of unlawful command influence only applies after charges have 
become official.
348
 This lack of oversight on charging decisions may be 
connected to a commander’s role as a military leader who is supposedly in 
the best position to decide what charges are necessary for good order and 
discipline. Thus, it would appear that the military adheres to a value of 
autonomy when it comes to this kind of discretion—quite different from 
 
 
 342. See generally King & O’Neill, supra note 235 (noting that some defendants received lighter 
sentences but others did not by entering into appeal waivers). Another consideration would be whether 
these waivers promote the efficiency of the system. See supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
 343. See generally King & O’Neill, supra note 235. In addition to autonomy and systemic 
integrity, efficiency may also be a consideration. See supra note 327 and accompanying text. 
 344. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 47. 
 345. See id. (“The Pentagon said that of the 5,061 reported cases, 484 went to trial, and 376 
resulted in convictions. The numbers, [Senator Gillibrand] said, ‘should send chills down people’s 
spines,’ because less than one of 10 reported cases proceeded to trial.”). The situation appears to be 
improving. See Craig Whitlock & Thomas Gibbons-Neff, More High-Ranking Officers Being Charged 
with Sex Crimes Against Subordinates, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/world/national-security/more-high-ranking-officers-being-charged-with-sex-crimes-against- 
subordinates/2016/03/19/3910352a-e616-11e5-a6f3-21ccdbc5f74e_story.html (discussing recent 
increase in sexual assault prosecutions).  
 346. See Carpenter, supra note 47; Cooper, supra note 47. 
 347. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.  
 348. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.  
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the systemic integrity that underscores a commander’s conduct during the 
trial process. 
This value of autonomy—at least in the sexual assault charging 
context—has failed to produce just results and must be reevaluated. The 
solution rests on inserting systemic integrity principles or structural 
restraints during the accusatory stage to ensure prosecution of sexual 
assault cases. Probably the most straightforward and potentially most 
effective solution—as many scholars have argued—would be to 
completely remove discretion from commanders and, like the civilian 
model, place it in the hands of prosecutors.
349
 This change would 
completely usurp a commander’s current level of autonomy, though in the 
process it may raise other issues regarding the nature of justice and 
discipline in the military system.
350
 
Legislators have proposed or recently enacted more modest structural 
changes to the charging process that also seek to curtail commander 
autonomy, at least to some degree. One proposal, which was ultimately 
rejected by the Senate, would have taken the discretion away from 
commanders in cases of sexual assault and placed it with military officials 
outside of the chain of command.
351
 Congress did, however, recently pass 
legislation that amended the UCMJ such that prosecutors now serve as a 
check on commander discretion in sexual assault cases.
352
 While the 
amendment does not change the commander-based prosecutorial 
discretion model, it inserts the prosecutor into the charging process by 
allowing her to raise the issue to the civilian service secretary if a 
commander chooses not to prosecute the case.
353
 
These mandatory procedures or restrictions on commander 
discretion—similar to the restraints on commander conduct during trial—
serve to ensure a fair and impartial criminal justice system without an 
emphasis on commander autonomy. Only this time the concern is not 
 
 
 349. See supra note 57.  
 350. Cf. Schlueter, supra note 50, at 14–43 (discussing whether military justice is grounded in 
discipline or justice and how this impacts the command-centered model). 
 351. Helene Cooper, Senate Rejects Blocking Military Commanders from Sexual Assault Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/07/us/politics/military-sexual-assault-
legislation.html.  
 352. See Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, 128 Stat. 3292, 3371–72 (2014) (codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C. § 834). 
 353. See id. Congress also passed other revisions that provide greater protections for victims of 
sexual assault. Matthew B. Tully, Changes to Sexual Assault Investigations, MILITARY TIMES (Apr. 
20, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/crime/2015/04/20/sexual-assault-
investigations-changes/25925919/, archived at https://perma.cc/G2A5-DY9B.  
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defendants receiving an unbiased trial, but defendants being brought to 
justice for sexual assault violations.
354
  
CONCLUSION 
Misconduct—whether by civilian prosecutors or military 
commanders—seems like a necessary evil. Any time a criminal justice 
system bestows an individual with prosecutorial discretionary power, there 
is a risk of overreach. The reason for this is that prosecutors and 
commanders alike have a vested interest in successful outcomes for the 
cases they bring. This desire may lead these individuals to do things they 
should not. The critical inquiry is how best to combat this risk. The 
military and civilian systems embody different philosophies beyond their 
shared prejudice baseline—one focuses more on systemic integrity and the 
other on individual autonomy. Given their unique features and history, this 
is perhaps not surprising.  
But moving forward, we must ask whether each system has 
incorporated the values in the right mix. To this question, the civilian 
system can learn something from the military and, perhaps, vice versa. 
The point here is that using the principles of autonomy and systemic 
integrity can help balance the need to minimize the risk of prosecutorial 
taint with the ability of a defendant to make her own decisions. This kind 
of exercise is not simply restricted to prosecutorial or commander 
misconduct, the focus of this Article. Similar to the Faretta discussion or 
 
 
 354. It is not clear whether undercharging of sexual assault plagues the civilian system to the same 
degree. See, e.g., Johanna Lee, The Quest for Military Sexual Assault Reform, HARV. POL. REV. (Apr. 
26, 2014, 10:14 PM), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/quest-military-sexual-assault-reform/, 
archived at https://perma.cc/EB8L-3NBY (“The military justice system prosecutes a smaller 
percentage of reported sexual assault cases than civilian courts. According to research by Cassia 
Spohn, professor of criminology and criminal justice at Arizona State University, civilian courts 
prosecute 50 percent of sexual assault cases, compared to 37 percent by military courts.”). But see THE 
WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN & GIRLS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RENEWED CALL TO 
ACTION 16–18 (2014), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/sexual_ 
assault_report_1-21-14.pdf (discussing the lower rates of arrests and prosecutions of sexual assaults). 
To the extent the civilian system does a better job, this may be due in large part to the greater public 
scrutiny prosecutors and their charging decisions receive compared to military commanders. See, e.g., 
NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard 25.1 cmt. (1977) 
(“As a public prosecutor constantly in the public eye, it is imperative that the prosecutor . . . avoid 
even the appearance of professional impropriety.”). Perhaps, when it comes to prosecutorial sexual 
assault charging decisions in the civilian system, the value of individual autonomy (at least 
comparatively) may still remain a good one. My point here is simply to underscore the fact that the 
competing principles of autonomy and systemic integrity should be applied to each system 
individually and the specific issue in question.  
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the unbundling theory described earlier, these principles potentially have a 
real role to play in exploring relevant reforms to our criminal justice 
system. 
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